Précis of Projection and Realism in Hume's Philosophy

Kail, P. J. E.

doi:10.1353/hms.2010.0009

Cited by 2 publications

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“…We can thus distinguish between two types of projective explanation for holding a belief, each meeting Kail's criteria for projection: Ersatz Response Projection (Kail, 2001; or Feature Projection , Kail, 2007)The subject's belief is a response to a phenomenology which is best explained by appeal to the subject's own mental life. This is ‘a matter of representing something “in here” to be “out there”’ (Kail, 2010, p. 62), as in the case of colour properties. Non-Response Projection (Kail, 2001; or Explanatory Projection , Kail, 2007)The subject's belief is best explained by features of the subject's non-inferential psychology and not as a response to any phenomenological feature. ‘For example, when we say that belief in God is a projection of our fear, we are not representing the world to contain our fear but saying that we hold the belief because we are fearful’ (Kail, 2010, p. 62).…”

Section: An Expanded View Of Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This is ‘a matter of representing something “in here” to be “out there”’ (Kail, 2010, p. 62), as in the case of colour properties. Non-Response Projection (Kail, 2001; or Explanatory Projection , Kail, 2007)The subject's belief is best explained by features of the subject's non-inferential psychology and not as a response to any phenomenological feature. ‘For example, when we say that belief in God is a projection of our fear, we are not representing the world to contain our fear but saying that we hold the belief because we are fearful’ (Kail, 2010, p. 62).…”

Section: An Expanded View Of Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The subject's belief is a response to a phenomenology which is best explained by appeal to the subject's own mental life. This is ‘a matter of representing something “in here” to be “out there”’ (Kail, 2010, p. 62), as in the case of colour properties.…”

Section: An Expanded View Of Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The subject's belief is best explained by features of the subject's non-inferential psychology and not as a response to any phenomenological feature. ‘For example, when we say that belief in God is a projection of our fear, we are not representing the world to contain our fear but saying that we hold the belief because we are fearful’ (Kail, 2010, p. 62).…”

Section: An Expanded View Of Projectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Passage of Time is Not an Illusion: It's a Projection

Bardon

2023

Philosophy

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This essay aims to review and clarify an emerging consensus among philosophers of time: that belief in the passage of time is not a matter of illusion but rather the result of a variety of cognitive error. I argue that this error is best described in terms of psychological projection, properly understood. A close analysis of varieties of projection reveals how well this phenomenon accounts for belief in dynamic temporal passage and the objective becoming of events. A projectivist account of belief in the passage of time is, in actuality, already predominant in contemporary philosophy of time; but the language of illusion still used by many theorists is hampering recognition of the nature of the solution as well as the recent progress towards consensus.

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