Praxis and Poiesis: Beyond the Dichotomy

Márkus, György

doi:10.1177/072551368601500103

Cited by 10 publications

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“…In ancient Greek, art identifies techne . Márkus (1986: 30), in his article ‘ Praxis and poiesis : Beyond the dichotomy’ argues:the conceptual dichotomy of poiesis and praxis , of making and doing, with the associated distinction between techne and phronesis , technical skill and practical reason, occupies a prominent place amongst those peripatetic ideas which contemporary philosophical thought frequently resuscitates as especially relevant to our present situation. This long neglected division of human activities into these two fundamental types brings into focus so it is argued – the fundamental malaise of our social existence: the atrophy of praxis as action proper, the transformation of all intentional human activity into some mode of making, into technically effective modes of behaviour.The dichotomy of praxis and poiesis comes from the Aristotelian schema of opposition.…”

Section: Praxis Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…According to Márkus, from the perspective of semantic analysis, Aristotle’s distinction is beset with a number of serious interpretative difficulties and paradoxes between these: action as an end itself and action as a means, pure praxis and pure poiesis , contemplation and praxis or poiesis . He says, ‘there are certain activities which in one context are designated by Aristotle as praxis, and in some other context as makings, as poiesis ’ (Márkus, 1986: 32). For Aristotle the highest humanely possible, most perfect, and self-sufficient form of praxis is a life of contemplation and it is opposed to praxis and poiesis , thus lacking character of act as such.…”

Section: Praxis Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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An introduction to György Márkus’s aesthetics: Transformation from praxis aesthetics to theory of aesthetic modernity

Qilin

2023

Thesis Eleven

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György Márkus, as a leading member of the Budapest School led by György Lukács in Hungary, is closely concerned with aesthetics. His final unfinished writings in political exile in Sydney were focused on the question of modern cultural autonomy. From the 1960s to the new century, from Budapest to Sydney in Australia, he established a new form of Neo-Marxist aesthetics on the basis of critical theory drawn from Lukács to the Frankfurt School. His aesthetics includes three dimensions: an aesthetics of praxis, a reconstruction of Lukács’s aesthetics and a theory of aesthetic modernity. His aesthetics is characteristic of analytic philosophy, especially ‘categorical analysis’. It shifts from philosophical aesthetics in the Hungarian period, which is based on an ontological foundation, that is, materialist phenomenology, to social or sociological aesthetics in the Australian period concerning social modernity, institution, constitution, culture, and so on. This is a turn from a philosophical paradigm to a structural one as regards aesthetics, which indicates a break with Lukács’s late return in the early 1960s to Hegelian inspired Ontology of Social Being. Márkus is strictly and essentially an essayist in fragments, who distinguishes himself from the other members of the Budapest School in this way. Ironically, this genre is once again influenced by the young Lukács’s aesthetics.

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Section: Praxis Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Praxis Aestheticsmentioning

confidence: 99%

An introduction to György Márkus’s aesthetics: Transformation from praxis aesthetics to theory of aesthetic modernity

Qilin

2023

Thesis Eleven

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“…Auch wenn die Autor*innen, die sich dieser Strömung zurechnen lassen, den Symptombefund teilen, so unterscheiden sie sich doch in der Ursachenanalyse und auch im jeweiligen Urteil, warum die diagnostizierte Überformung beklagenswert ist. Folglich lassen sich dieser Strömung sowohl progressive als auch reaktionäre Autor*innen zuordnen (Markus 1986). Insbesondere wurde nach dem 2.…”

Section: K 1 Die Kritik An Instrumentellen Politikverständnissenunclassified

Politisches Handeln. Zum Verhältnis von Zielorientierung und Collective Agency

Möller

Schink

2022

Polit Vierteljahresschr

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ZusammenfassungDer Beitrag geht dem Verhältnis von Zielen und Collective Agency im politischen Handeln nach. Dabei wird die These entwickelt, dass das unmittelbare Erfahren und Gestalten von gemeinsamen Handlungsverhältnissen die Zielorientierung in der Politik nicht ersetzen kann, sondern als eine wichtige Bestandsbedingung des politischen Handelns zu verstehen ist. Ausgangspunkt sind dabei Positionen, wie sie in der politischen Theorie bisher am deutlichsten von Hannah Arendt vertreten wurden und in unserer Gegenwart insbesondere in neuen sozialen Bewegungen verbreitet sind: Diesen zufolge besteht der Kern politischen Handelns in der Erfahrung einer Collective Agency. Der Beitrag rekonstruiert diesen Zugriff anhand der Schriften Hannah Arendts und verortet ihn im Umfeld bestehender Theorieansätze sowie von Erkenntnissen der Aufstands- und Rebellionsforschung. Schließlich werden handlungstheoretische Überlegungen angestellt (u. a. im Hinblick auf die Unterscheidung zwischen Haupt- und Nebenprodukten und die Zweistufigkeit in Handlungsprozessen). Sie laufen darauf hinaus, die Collective Agency in eine komplexere Zielorientierung aufzunehmen. Dadurch ergibt sich eine Korrektur sowohl instrumenteller Politikverständnisse als auch von Theorien, die den Sinn von Politik im Vollzug der Handlungsprozesse selbst ansiedeln.

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“…This means-ends distinction can be summarized this way: what is required of the thinking of technē through poïesis that liberates the will of praxis, where praxis through phronēsis wants only itself. Yet, Markus (1986) asserts that elsewhere, Aristotle assigns ends to praxis, blurring the actions-ends distinction. Moreover, Aristotle assigns heterogeneous examples of praxis that range from a sensation to virtuous deeds (a well-lived life, consumption, accomplishments such as playing the harp well, healing someone from illness, and various political and military activities, and management of a household) that it becomes difficult to meaningfully assert anything about this class of activities (Markus, 1986).…”

Section: Philosophically Situating Making: Disruptive Practicesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Critical Making Takes a Holiday

Pinto

Blue

2021

Encounters

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“Making” is used to engage young people into ways of collaborative learning using materials, resources, and equipment in makerspace environments. In this paper we attempt to interrogate the popular maker movement’s “state-of-the-actual” in education with respect to its criticality. We begin by conceptually clarifying the movement with respect to its semantic disarray. Next, we situate maker and production pedagogies philosophically, and discuss how their thrust and emphasis create both hidden and overt curricula that can either cultivate or silence criticality. Finally, we problematize the effects of uncritical exuberance for educational making, and propose concrete strategies in which educators can nudge their own makerspaces into more state-of-the-art environments that promote criticality.

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Praxis and Poiesis: Beyond the Dichotomy

Cited by 10 publications

References 0 publications

An introduction to György Márkus’s aesthetics: Transformation from praxis aesthetics to theory of aesthetic modernity

An introduction to György Márkus’s aesthetics: Transformation from praxis aesthetics to theory of aesthetic modernity

Politisches Handeln. Zum Verhältnis von Zielorientierung und Collective Agency

Critical Making Takes a Holiday

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