Pragmatic Inferences and Type of Processing

Barclay, Craig R.; Toglia, Michael P.; Chevalier, Dolores S.

doi:10.2307/1422601

Cited by 3 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 17 publications

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“…First, our suspicion was supported, as the sem antic processors recalled m ore study item s and more critical nonpresented item s. Interestingly, subjects in both conditions recalled the critical nonpresented item s at very high rates. A similar pattern of findings was reported by Barclay et al (1984). They had subjects study a series of sentences, som e of which were likely to elicit a pragm atic inference, an implication not dem anded by a statement.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

“…M odern examples of spontaneous, as opposed to im planted, illusory m em ories for verbal materials include false recognition attributed to im plicit associative responses (IARs) (Underwood, 1965); false positives attributed to overlapp ing fam iliarity of old words and their associates (Hall & Kozloff, 1973 ;Zim merman & Kimble, 1973); false recall of prose passages (Hasher & Griffin, 1978 ;Sulin & Dooling, 1974); and confusion of old and new sentences based on thematic abstraction (Bransford & Franks, 1971). There is also evidence showing that subjects often recall the pragm atic implication of a sentence rather than the sentence itself (Barclay, Toglia, & Chevalier, 1984 ;Brewer, 1977).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Recall Accuracy and Illusory Memories: When More is Less

Toglia

Neuschatz²,

Goodwin³

1999

Memory

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In two experiments it was revealed that manipulations that increased recall of studied list items also increased false recall of theme-related, critical nonpresented words. In Experiment 1 subjects listened to a series of short word lists, each containing items associatively related to a theme, while engaging in either semantic or nonsemantic processing. On an immediate free recall test semantic processors demonstrated greater correct recall as well as more illusory memories of critical nonpresented items than nonsemantic processors. In Experiment 2, the short study lists were combined to form longer lists that were presented either blocked by theme or in a random presentation order. Retention interval was also varied as participants were tested either immediately, one week after, or three weeks after the study phase. Presenting the target items in a blocked, as opposed to random, format increased recall accuracy, but this was at the expense of a higher intrusion rate for theme-consistent items. Interestingly, the level of false memories was not affected by retention interval even though typical decrements in the recall of study items were observed over time. The results of these experiments highlight the persistence of the false memory effect, as well as pointing to several factors, primarily semantic processing, that may lead to the creation of false memories. Interpretations are offered within the theoretical frameworks of source monitoring and fuzzy trace theory.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 79%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Recall Accuracy and Illusory Memories: When More is Less

Toglia

Neuschatz²,

Goodwin³

1999

Memory

Self Cite

260

233

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…In the example, the term “ champion ” implies qualities of capability and strength, which may lead the reader to infer that he/she was able to break the cinder block when, in fact, he/she might not have. Therefore, although the inference might be semantically consistent with what is presented in the sentence, it was not explicitly stated at the episodic level ( Brewer, 1977 ; Barclay et al, 1984 ; McKoon and Ratcliff, 1992 ; Graesser et al, 1994 ; Raposo and Marques, 2013 ).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…Moreover, they represent a sensitive and robust measure for the study of false memories since they allow for the dissociation between the semantic and episodic memory levels. In other words, what is inferred and remembered from a character in a sentence depends, in part, on what the reader knows about the characteristics of the character ( Barclay et al, 1984 ). In the example, the term “ champion ” implies qualities of capability and strength, which may lead the reader to infer that he/she was able to break the cinder block when, in fact, he/she might not have.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It has been demonstrated that later memory recall for pragmatic inference sentences is sensitive to manipulations in the encoding phase, such as, for example, the repetition of the materials during study ( McDermott and Chan, 2006 ), or whether subjects encode sentences using or not a semantic strategy ( Barclay et al, 1984 ). Thus, despite the robustness of false memories, experimental manipulations in the way items are processed during encoding can modulate retrieval in different false memory paradigms.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Imagination Reduces False Memories for Everyday Action Sentences: Evidence From Pragmatic Inferences

et al. 2021

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Human memory can be unreliable, and when reading a sentence with a pragmatic implication, such as “the karate champion hit the cinder block,” people often falsely remember that the karate champion “broke” the cinder block. Yet, research has shown that encoding instructions affect the false memories we form. On the one hand, instructing participants to imagine themselves manipulating the to-be-recalled items increase false memories (imagination inflation effect). But on the other hand, instructions to imagine have reduced false memories in the DRM paradigm (imagination facilitation effect). Here, we explored the effect of imaginal encoding with pragmatic inferences, a way to study false memories for information about everyday actions. Across two experiments, we manipulated imaginal encoding through the instructions given to participants and the after-item filler task (none vs. math operations). In Experiment 1, participants were either assigned to the encoding condition of imagine+no filler; pay attention+math; or memorize+math. In Experiment 2, the encoding instructions (imagine vs. memorize) and the filler task (none vs. math) were compared across four separate conditions. Results from the two experiments showed that imagination instructions lead to better memory, by showing a higher proportion of correct responses and better performance in a memory benefit index. Similarly, a significant reduction of false memories was observed across both experiments, even though a complementary Bayesian analysis only supported this conclusion for Experiment 1. The findings show that imaginal encoding improves memory, suggesting the engagement of a distinctiveness heuristic and source-monitoring process.

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Novel Approaches and Cognitive Neuroscience Perspectives on False Memory and Deception

et al. 2022

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The DRM (Deese–Roediger–McDermott) paradigm produces robust false memories of non-presented critical words. After studying a thematic word list (e.g., bed, rest, and pillow) participants falsely remember the critical item “sleep.” We report two false memory experiments. Study One introduces a novel use of the lexical decision task (LDT) to prime critical words. Participants see two letter-strings and make timed responses indicating whether they are both words. The word pairs Night-Bed and Dream-Thweeb both prime “sleep” but only one pair contains two words. Our primary purpose is to introduce this new methodology via two pilot experiments. The results, considered preliminary, are promising as they indicate that participants were as likely to recognize critical words (false memories) and presented words (true memories) just as when studying thematic lists. Study Two actually employs the standard DRM lists so that semantic priming is in play there as well. The second study, however, uses functional near-infrared spectroscopy (fNIRS) to measure activity in the prefrontal cortex during a DRM task which includes a deception phase where participants intentionally lie about critical lures. False and true memories occurred at high levels and activated many of the same brain regions but, compared to true memories, cortical activity was higher for false memories and lies. Accuracy findings are accompanied by confidence and reaction time results. Both investigations suggest that it is difficult to distinguish accurate from inaccurate memories. We explain results in terms of activation-monitoring theory and Fuzzy Trace Theory. We provide real world implications and suggest extending the present research to varying age groups and special populations. A nagging question has not been satisfactorily answered: Could neural pathways exist that signal the presence of false memories and lies? Answering this question will require imaging experiments that focus on regions of distinction such as the anterior prefrontal cortex.

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Pragmatic Inferences and Type of Processing

Cited by 3 publications

References 17 publications

Recall Accuracy and Illusory Memories: When More is Less

Recall Accuracy and Illusory Memories: When More is Less

Imagination Reduces False Memories for Everyday Action Sentences: Evidence From Pragmatic Inferences

Novel Approaches and Cognitive Neuroscience Perspectives on False Memory and Deception

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