No abstract

Given that familiarity is closely associated with positivity, the authors sought evidence for the idea that positivity would increase perceived familiarity. In Experiment 1, smiling and thus positively perceived novel faces were significantly more likely to be incorrectly judged as familiar than novel faces with neutral expressions. In Experiment 2, subliminal association with positive affect (a positively valenced prime) led to false recognition of novel words as familiar. In Experiment 3, validity judgments, known to be influenced by familiarity, were more likely to occur if participants were in happy mood states than neutral mood states. Despite their different paradigms and approaches, the results of these three studies converge on the idea that, at least under certain circumstances, the experience of positivity itself can signal familiarity, perhaps because the experience of familiarity is typically positive.

The incongruency effect and the expectancy-based illusory correlation effect seem contradictory because they describe apparently contrasting consequences of previously held expectancies: better recall of incongruent than congruent items but overestimation of congruent items. This article resolves this dilemma by presenting a model that is able to simultaneously predict both of these effects. The Twofold Retrieval by Associative Pathways (TRAP) model adopts the encoding assumptions of person memory models but distinguishes between two different retrieval processes, exhaustive and heuristic, hypothesized to underlie recall and frequency estimation, respectively. Experiment 1 showed that expectancy-based illusory correlation effects and incongruency effects are compatible in that they were produced simultaneously. Experiments 2 and 3 tested and rejected alternative explanations for the obtained pattern of results.

Stereotypes have been assumed to be long-lasting knowledge structures that persist even in the face of contrary evidence. However, there is almost no within-participant research relevant to this assumption. The authors describe 4 studies (N=267), the first 3 of which assessed within-participant stereotype stability over a few weeks with measures of stereotypic trait verification, typicality ratings of exemplar sets, and exemplar retrieval. In the 4th study, the authors manipulated context stability. Overall, results showed only low-to-moderate stereotype stability. The stability obtained was a function of the perceived centrality of traits or exemplars and of context constancy. The authors discuss the implications of these results for abstractionist, exemplar, mixed, and connectionist models and identify possible mechanisms that underlie within-participant stereotype instability.

Three experiments showed increases in the perceived variability of social groups after perceivers received stereotype-incongruent information about group members. In Experiment 1, participants generated flatter distributions after exposure to incongruent information, compared with equally deviant congruent information, in the form of typical verbal materials. Experiment 2 indicated similar changes in dispersion after the presentation of numeric information about a single group member. In Experiment 3, the authors manipulated cognitive load at encoding or at the time group judgments were requested. Under conditions of cognitive constraint, stereotype-incongruent information ceased to promote more dispersed group representations. These results are consistent with the idea that incongruent information triggers more deliberative and comprehensive retrieval and generation of exemplars. The authors discuss the implications of these findings for stereotype change.