Practical Receipt-Free Sealed-Bid Auction in the Coercive Environment

Abstract

Abstract. Sealed-Bid auction is an efficient and rational method to establish the price in open market. However sealed-bid auctions are subject to bid-rigging attack. Receipt-free mechanisms were proposed to prevent bid-rigging. The prior receipt-free mechanisms are based on two assumptions; firstly, existence of untappable channel between bidders and auction authorities. Secondly, mechanisms assume the authorities to be honest (not colluding). Moreover the bandwidth required to communicate the receipt-free bids is huge. This paper presents a sealed-bid auction mechanism to resist bid-rigging. The proposed method does not assume untappable channel nor consider the authorities to be necessarily honest. The proposed mechanism also manages the bandwidth efficiently, and improves the performance of the system.

Formal modelling and analysis of receipt-free auction protocols in applied pi

“…In the original paper [18], the PDE outputs two types of encryptions: one type with three parameters, c = Enc − (m t , pk, r t ), and the other with four parameters, c d = Enc m f (m t , pk, r t ), where m t and r t are real message and real random and m f is the fake message. Both of them is decrypted as m t .…”

“…However, it is not clear whether c equals c d . Following the intuition of PDE, we consider them as the same (or 'look alike' [18]). More importantly, if c is not the same as c d , the adversary would be able to distinguish whether the encryption used is a three parametrised version or four parametrised version, by coercing for m t and r t .…”

“…In the original paper [18], by applying Algorithm 2, a bid from bidder i at price represented by element (k, j) in the price list is sealed as (X S t i,(k, j) ,Y S t i,(k, j) ), where S 1 , . .…”

“…For example, the Okamoto e-voting protocol [16] which claimed to satisfy receipt-freeness expressed in natural language, was later shown flawed with respect to a rigorous definition [17]; and according to the author, one important reason is the lack of formal definition of receipt-freeness in e-voting. To validate our formalisation, we model and study privacy properties of the AS02 protocol proposed by Abe and Suzuki [4] (Section 5) and the HRM14 protocol proposed by Howlader et al [18] (Section 6). The authors of both papers claim that their protocol satisfies the above two requirements for non-winning bidders and provide an informal analysis.…”

Sealed‐bid auction: a cryptographic solution to bid‐rigging attack in the collusive environment

“…Howlader et al proposed a receipt‐free mechanism on the principle of multiparty computation and was further revised in . The mechanisms comprise with multiple sealers. The sealers collaboratively perform the sealing operation to form the receipt‐free bids.…”