Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action

Small, Will

doi:10.1515/9783110277944.133

Cited by 30 publications

(24 citation statements)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Indeed, in her discussion of practical senses (Pavese, 2015b), she says she is "appealing to practical senses to provide a personal explanation of a certain subset of a subject's abilities" and "the level of explanation at which [her] arguments work is personal:… [her] abilities only encompass competences that a subject can be properly said to possess" (Pavese, 2015b, p. 18, emphasis in original). I suspect this focus is why she says "an elementary operation for a system s at a time t is one that s can perform at t but of which s cannot perform at t a 22 Arguments for moving away from the primacy of basic action can be found in Lavin (2012), Small (2012), and Thompson (2008b). 23 Pavese tells us that primitive rules are not equivalent to any sequence of other rules, and basic rules do not contain any other rules as parts.…”

Section: Basic Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Arguments for moving away from the primacy of basic action can be found in Lavin (), Small (), and Thompson ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It also seems to me that the literature discussing Elizabeth Anscombe's work is motivated by similar questions. See the essays in Ford, Hornsby andStoutland (2011) andO'Brien (2007), Rödl (2011), Schwenkler (2015), Small (2012), and Thompson (2008a). 5 There are by now several versions of intellectualism.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Modeling practical thinking

Mosdell

2018

Mind & Language

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Intellectualists about knowledge‐how argue that knowing how to do something is knowing the content of a proposition (i.e., a fact). An important component of this view is the idea that propositional knowledge is translated into behavior when it is presented to the mind in a peculiarly practical way. Until recently, however, intellectualists have not said much about what it means for propositional knowledge to be entertained under thought's practical guise. Carlotta Pavese fills this gap in the intellectualist view by modeling practical modes of thought after Fregean senses. In this paper, I take up her model and the presuppositions it is built upon, arguing that her view of practical thought is not positioned to account for much of what human agents are able to do.

show abstract

Section: Basic Actionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Arguments for moving away from the primacy of basic action can be found in Lavin (), Small (), and Thompson ().…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Modeling practical thinking

Mosdell

2018

Mind & Language

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…First, the sense-data theory claims that we are first-personally and non-evidentially aware of certain internal, mind-dependent objects; these mind-dependent objects are ontologically distinct from the 54 See Setiya 2008 andPaul 2009. 55 See Marcus 2012 andSmall 2012. We think the claim is wrong both as a matter of Anscombe interpretation and as a philosophical position.…”

Section: Failure In Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action

Frey

2017

Philosophical Books

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

“…Furthermore, these cognitive commitments must arguably provide me with knowledge of what I am doing intentionally when I am acting (perhaps in virtue of my skills and know-how, see e.g. Setiya 2008;O'Brien 2003;Grünbaum 2009;Small 2012). That the commitment is true is not sufficient for intentional action.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Practical Knowledge and Acting Together

Blomberg

2018

Oxford Scholarship Online

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This chapter explores a problem that joint action raises for an influential philosophical view of the nature of intentional action. According to this view, an agent is intentionally -ing if and only if she has a special kind of practical and non-observational knowledge that she is -ing. It is here argued, however, that this view faces serious problems when extended to make sense of the possibility of an intentional action performed by several agents together. Since a general theory of intentional action should be applicable to both singular and joint intentional action, this suggests that practical and non-observational knowledge is not essential to intentional action as such.

show abstract

Practical Knowledge and the Structure of Action

Cited by 30 publications

References 0 publications

Modeling practical thinking

Modeling practical thinking

G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action

Practical Knowledge and Acting Together

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About