G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action

Frey, Christopher; Frey, Jennifer A.

doi:10.1111/phib.12101

Cited by 41 publications

(13 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…The argument has been forcefully pressed by Paul (2009). For further discussion, and its parallels to the argument from illusion in the philosophy of perception, see Frey and Frey (2017). epistemic gap between two independently specifiable realities: an agent's intention to ϕ and her actual performance of ϕ-ing.…”

Section: The Specification Problem and The Standard Account Of Practimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…18. For recent work on the role of form in action explanation, see Ford (2015), Rödl (2007), Small (2012), Vogler (2001), and Frey and Frey (2017).…”

Section: Practical Knowledge and The Unity Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Anscombe's claims about practical reason are not best understood psychologically, but logically. For more arguments to this effect, see Wiseman (2016) and Frey and Frey (2017).…”

Section: Practical Reasoning and The Goodmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good

Frey¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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This paper addresses how Elizabeth Anscombe understands the link between action theory and ethics, by focusing on her theory of practical knowledge. I argue that, for Anscombe, a capacity for practical knowledge is best understood as a capacity to do things for reasons, where reasons are the ends pursued by the agent as practically intelligible goods; on this view, knowing what one is doing and knowing the intended good of doing it are two different aspects of one and the same practical knowledge. On my reading of Anscombe, the central task of action theory is to elucidate this capacity for practical knowledge, which is exercised anytime one acts in the characteristically human way (intentionally or voluntarily). The proper task of ethics, by contrast, is to elucidate the perfected exercise of this power in the practically wise or virtuous person-i.e., the one who is properly disposed to act for the right reasons and thus lives well.

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Section: The Specification Problem and The Standard Account Of Practimentioning

confidence: 99%

“…18. For recent work on the role of form in action explanation, see Ford (2015), Rödl (2007), Small (2012), Vogler (2001), and Frey and Frey (2017).…”

Section: Practical Knowledge and The Unity Of Actionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good

Frey¹

2019

Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy

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“…I am breaking eggs because I am making an omelet, or intend to do so, and I am making an omelet because I am preparing breakfast for my family, etc. Here the reasons for action are provided by other actions, and the agent's end in acting is to complete the action in question, in the process of completing the more comprehensive action that provides its rationale (Thompson , 138ff; Anscombe , 38; Moran and Stone , 53–55; Frey and Frey ).…”

Section: Section Ii: Action and The Two Senses Of Bringing It Aboutmentioning

confidence: 99%

Exiting The Consequentialist Circle: Two Senses of Bringing It About

Hurley

2019

Philosophical Books

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“… Among those heading this development we can include: Alvarez (), Falvey (), Frey (), Hursthouse (), Moran (), Paul (), Rodriguez‐Blanco (), Schwenkler (), Setiya (), Teichman (), and, notably, Thompson ().…”

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confidence: 99%

Intention in Criminal Law: The Challenge from Non‐Observational Knowledge

Donnelly-Lazarov

2017

Ratio Juris

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Intention is at the heart of criminal law. If it is not the mens rea requirement found most often in offences, it is still the standard against which other grades of fault tend relatively to be judged. It has generated much controversy, as the crucial question, “Did the defendant intend X?” is resistant to clear answers. This paper argues that intention‐questions are difficult because intention is not the thing law takes it to be: Importantly, contrary to law's assumptions, it is neither a state of mind nor is it connected in an exclusive manner to the reasons for which we act.

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G.E.M. Anscombe on the Analogical Unity of Intention in Perception and Action

Cited by 41 publications

References 30 publications

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good

Anscombe on Practical Knowledge and the Good

Exiting The Consequentialist Circle: Two Senses of Bringing It About

Intention in Criminal Law: The Challenge from Non‐Observational Knowledge

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