Power-sharing after Civil War: Thirty Years since Lebanon’s Taif Agreement

Nagle, John; Clancy, Mary-Alice C.

doi:10.1080/13537113.2019.1565171

Cited by 19 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 5 publications

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“…During the Lebanese civil war, militant groups comprising both the Sunni and Shia dominant factions emerged and gained considerable popularity. That said, Sunni factions were disarmed as part of the war-ending Taif Agreement (1990), and no war-era Sunni militiant organizations were reconfigured as post-war parties (Nagle and Clancy 2019). On the other hand, Hezbollah was allowed to retain its armed capacity under the justification that this reassured against ongoing Israeli military action, much of it in Shia-majority areas of Lebanon.…”

Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commitment to the “National” in Post-Conflict Countries: Public and Private Security Provision in Lebanon

Cammett

Parreira

Kruszewska-Eduardo³

et al. 2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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A core function of contemporary states is to ensure the security of their citizens. Yet in many post-conflict settings, non-state actors provide security alongside the state, typically prioritizing their own ascriptive groups and potentially undercutting a sense of national political community. When do citizens prefer group-specific versus national security? While most studies focus on individual psychological factors, we argue that group-level characteristics also shape political preferences. Based on a conjoint experiment in Lebanon, we explore the relative appeal of group-specific versus national pledges to assure protection. We find that respondents view national security provision quite positively, while members of communities with stronger group-specific security simultaneously favor private provision. Individuals with closer ties to credible group security providers are also more likely to prefer those services. Citizens therefore do not see a clear trade-off between private and public protection, while group-specific legacies mediate heterogeneity in support for pluralist security provision.

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Section: Case Selectionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Commitment to the “National” in Post-Conflict Countries: Public and Private Security Provision in Lebanon

Cammett

Parreira

Kruszewska-Eduardo³

et al. 2022

Journal of Conflict Resolution

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“…In so doing, the militias used a combination of violence and services to cement control over their fiefdoms. By the end of the war, the largest militia groups were operating as states within the state, with their own social welfare departments, press and media outlets, and powerful political parties proclaiming to defend the interests of particular sects (Nagle and Clancy 2019).…”

Section: Beirut: the Divided Citymentioning

confidence: 99%

Disarticulation and chains of equivalence: agonism and non-sectarian movements in post-war Beirut

Nagle

2021

Third World Quarterly

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Divided cities are characterised by intergroup contestation over the wider issue of state legitimacy. Violent conflict has left a legacy of segregation, weak public services and clientelistic networks. Debates and practices for conflict management in divided cities centre on accommodationist or integrationist approaches. While accommodationist methods seek to recognise and accommodate ethnosectarian divisions within public institutions, it risks intensifying ethnosectarian polarisation and empowering elites to deepen control over communities. Integrationist methods, alternatively, aim to foster shared identities and relationships between groups, but are too optimistic in assuming that divisions can be overcome through rational deliberation. As an alternative, I deploy Mouffe's theory of agonistic conflict to show how various non-sectarian movements contest the hegemony of a sectarian system that reproduces exclusion and inequality. To this end, I use key dimensions of agonism -'rearticulation/disarticulation' and 'chains of equivalence'-to analyse different types of non-sectarian actors and successive waves of protest, known as 'You Stink' and the 'Thawra' , in post-war Beirut. The divided cityDivided cities are the ground zero upon which ethnosectarian 1 conflicts emerge and are sustained in the long term. Cities such as Belfast, Jerusalem, Beirut and Mostar are shaped by violently contending visions of state belonging that have left a legacy of polarisation across the polity and wider society (

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“…With the establishment of an independent Lebanon, a complex, rigid power-sharing agreement structured the country's governance around 18 official "confessions," or religious faiths. Influence was apportioned by the population size of each faith according to the Frenchadministered 1932 census, and has never undergone a substantial revision despite vastly different demographic trajectories and urgent calls for a new national political imagination (Nagle and Clancy 2019). Despite long-evident interethnic tensions the middle-20 th century is often depicted as an especially glorious period of relatively harmonious, cosmopolitan economic advancement in Beirut (Khalaf 2006), when it was regarded as a "Paris of the Orient" in culture and style, and "Switzerland of the Middle East" for its especially diverse and peaceable blend of religions even as conflict wracked neighboring territories, including the influx of tens of thousands of Palestinian refugees after the establishment of Israel (Kassir 2010: 439-467).…”

Section: Comparative Development Trajectories and Discourses From Ist...mentioning

confidence: 99%

On not being Dubai: infrastructures of urban cultural policy in Istanbul & Beirut

Centner

2020

International Journal of Cultural Policy

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This paper compares how Istanbul and Beirut both attempt to underline their cultural and developmental uniqueness today in contrast to a metonymic menace -Dubai, standing in for spectacular yet supposedly culture-less Gulf cities. Even amid their own speculative construction frenzies that threaten local heritage, Turkish and Lebanese city-shapers assert theirs are "real" cities because they have "civilization" and "history." By addressing their own efforts to build, defend, or oppose physical infrastructures related to local urban culture, Istanbullus and Beirutis rely on and reassert strategic, phatic discourses that frequently reference Gulf cities as counterpoint. Analysis focuses on how each city crafts a distinctive urban profile via civilizational appeals to historic senses of culture, inflecting infrastructural developments related to bridging (Istanbul) and bordering (Beirut). Historical truisms are deployed with marked flexibility to showcase these cities as "not Dubai." This study offers lessons on the particular worlding of Middle Eastern cities and the role of discourses in the material-symbolic infrastructure of implicit urban cultural policy.

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Power-sharing after Civil War: Thirty Years since Lebanon’s Taif Agreement

Cited by 19 publications

References 5 publications

Commitment to the “National” in Post-Conflict Countries: Public and Private Security Provision in Lebanon

Commitment to the “National” in Post-Conflict Countries: Public and Private Security Provision in Lebanon

Disarticulation and chains of equivalence: agonism and non-sectarian movements in post-war Beirut

On not being Dubai: infrastructures of urban cultural policy in Istanbul & Beirut

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