Power ideas and conflict: ideology, linkage and leverage in Crimea and Chechnya

Abstract

In this article, we not only extend the concept of linkages and leverage to the realm of conflict studies, we also add an important linkageideas about political power which we call power ideasand we expand on the causal mechanisms that turns linkages into leverage in a conflict situation. We examine the impact of the power ideas of nationalism and Islamism in the cases of two major conflicts in the region: Crimea and Chechnya. Within-case comparison of episodes of conflict-prevention vs. annexation (Crimea in the 1990s vs. 2014) and violent conflict vs. cooptation in Chechnya (1990s and 1999 onwards) provides the empirical basis to assess the scope and limitations of the international context allowing for the activation of power ideas and their transformation into leverage.

Russian Geopolitical Advancements in the Black Sea Region: The Annexation of Crimea

“…Th e President argued that the global architecture was unjust, the U.S. undermined principles of international coexistence, and Russia found itself in a position of geopolitical inferiority 1 . To fi x these fl aws, Putin announced his state's likely return to the Soviet-style non-compromised policies (Hughes, Sasse, 2016).…”

“…As the Maidan was coming to its end in Kyiv -in particular when President Viktor Yanukovych fl ed the country in February 2014 -Kremlin decision-makers activated all nodes in Crimea. Blockade and seizing the Crimean parliament, orchestrating the dubious appointment of Sergey Aksyonov as the Prime Minister, and fi nally the running of the pro-independence referendum -that would be impossible to complete within days without any preparation (Hughes, Sasse, 2016). Especially, in consideration to the Ukrainian Black Sea Fleet which was stationed in Sevastopol and the Crimean Tatars who were actively protesting against any anti-Ukrainian rallies.…”

“…As the fi nal accord, on the 16 March 2014, Aksyonov initiated a referendum on Crimean status searching for legal premises to secede the peninsula from Ukraine to Russia. With 95% of votes in favor of leaving Ukraine, the Kremlin -unlike the rest of the civilized world -recognized the referendum results and accepted Crimea as one of Russia's federal subjects (Hughes, Sasse, 2016).…”

Federalism in Eastern Europe During and after Communism

“…By "Chechenisation" Putin accepted what has been termed "separatism without secession" -a higher degree of self-rule for Chechnya than any other Russian federal subject, and a form of authoritarian Islamisation that sets Chechnya de facto outside the Russian constitutional order in a kind of "dual state" (Sakwa 2010). The Putin-Kadyrov tandem has successfully crushed the Islamist insurgency in the North Caucasus, at the price of a special autonomy for the Kadyrov regime, and massively disproportional fiscal subsidies to stabilise and reconstruct Chechnya (Hughes and Sasse, 2016).…”

researching networked insurgencies and foreign fighters in Eurasia

“…There is first the diversity of ideological frames deployed to define and legitimate insurgency. Parochial ideologies and transnational "power ideas" (Hughes and Sasse 2016) have interacted in far more complex ways than reified understandings of global jihad as ideologically unified allow for. There is then diversity in the viability and opportunity structures available in different theatres of insurgency.…”