Poverty, politics and the shaping of urban space: a Brazilian example

Repertórios de interação estado-sociedade em um estado heterogêneo: a experiência na Era Lula

“…Os movimentos de moradia têm se envolvido em protestos e ocupações desde os anos 1970, incialmente com um foco na publicização de demandas e na afirmação de sua autonomia em relação ao Estado (Banck, 1986;Gay, 1990). A partir de 1987, no entanto, o MNRU buscou transformar as instituições políticas nacionais, inicialmente através da Constituição então em formulação.…”

Peopling mountain environments: changing Andean livelihoods in north‐west Argentina1

“…Within the Latin American context in particular, research has focussed on clientalism and patronage as part of networks of survival amongst the urban poor, especially within shanty towns (Banck 1986; Stokes 1991; Burgwal 1995; Gay 1994; Auyero 2000). This paper extends such analyses to rural livelihoods, stressing the role of ‘political clientalism’, in which public resources are dispersed (or promised) as favours in return for votes and/or other forms of political support, although this process is more complex than the simple swapping of votes for reward (Banck 1986; Auyero 2000).…”

“…The case of political clientalism in Argentina demonstrates the need to acknowledge the explicitly political elements which structure livelihoods. The evidence of modern forms of political clientalism suggests that such power relations are not exclusive to the urban setting in Argentina or wider Latin America (Banck 1986; Stokes 1991; Burgwal 1995; Gay 1994; Auyero 2000). Resource use is moulded by politically motivated decisions as well as questions of socio‐economic need, and the livelihood opportunities presented to rural residents will also be bound by political circumstances.…”

The Irrelevance of Social Capital in Explaining Deprivation: A Case Study of Turkish Gecekondu Households

“…The anthropological literature refers to it as a specific type of dyadic relationship, which ties people with unequal status or power and which depends on exchange of favours between these actors (Boissevain 1974; Scott 1977; Eisenstadt & Roniger 1984; Burgwal 1995). In the political science literature, clientelism is understood as a ‘political machine’ by which mass‐based parties mobilise political support (Nelson 1979; Chubb 1982; Banck 1986). I conceive of clientelism as a form of ‘unilateral exchange’ where the transaction of favours between parties depends on the compliance of the less powerful party (Eroğlu 2000).…”