Potential for co-management approaches to strengthen livelihoods of forest dependent communities: A Kenyan case

Abstract

Many natural resource management researchers have focused either on institutional design and evaluation or on livelihood outcomes per se without explicitly acknowledging and rigorously examining linkages between the two. Thus, a major gap in the current literature on comanagement institutional arrangements is the extent to which co-management has strengthened the livelihoods of poor forest-dependent communities. This gap is addressed in this paper by developing and testing an argument that well-designed co-management arrangements have strengthened the livelihood outcomes of poor forest-dependent communities in a Kenyan case study. The hybrid analytical framework developed for this analysis situates Ostrom's (1990) design criteria for co-management institutions in the broader context of the Sustainable Livelihood Framework. It then uses this analytical framework to evaluate the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve (ASFR) co-management initiative in Kenya, based on a three-step process. First, the paper provides an overview of current institutional arrangements for governance of the ASFR co-management regime. Second, it evaluates the extent to which these governance arrangements can be characterized as devolved collaborative governance, informed by Ostrom's (1990) design principles and; third, it evaluates the extent to which the livelihood outcomes of forest dependent communities that are participants in the co-management project have had their livelihoods strengthened as a result of the ASFR co-management governance arrangements. The paper demonstrates that the institutional arrangements for ASFR co-management are relatively nascent and emerging because the governance arrangements for the ASFR co-management project cannot be characterized as fully devolved de jure collaborative governance. Notwithstanding this, the findings reveal that participant forest-dependent communities in the co-management project had improved livelihoods compared to forest-dependent communities outside the comanagement scheme. It is suggested that this is due to the de facto co-management arrangements.

NGOs come and go but business continues: lessons from co-management institutional arrangements for governance of the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve in Kenya

“…However, welldesigned co-management arrangement institutions should not fail, but instead are expected to improve the livelihoods of poor communities living adjacent to the forest that depend on the forest resources as a source of their livelihood (Baumann 2000;Pagdee et al 2006;Ming'ate et al 2014). Workable co-management approaches should also be able to transfer some management rights that create comanagement systems that are not problematic and that do not make the forest-dependent communities feel alienated in the co-management process.…”

Effectiveness of Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) in addressing development-induced disasters: a comparison of the EIA processes of Sri Lanka and New Zealand

“…As per the World Bank, this also includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced. Although the World Bank's definition is biased towards the formal coercive power of governments, some literature focuses on both formal and informal arrangements through which decisions are made and implemented in order to advance social goals (Guarnacci, 2012;Ming'ate, Rennie, & Memon, 2014). However, the role of governments in governance and their accountability towards protection of society and the environment is a fundamentally accepted norm today.…”

Designing Institutional Arrangements for Collaborative Governance of Forests in Kenya Using a Delphi Process

“…However, these institutional design principles have received criticisms from many scholars [8,9,10,11], including Ostrom herself [7]. Yet a number of studies also indicate that the use of Ostrom's [12] institutional design principles to design common-pool resource management systems does not always result in stable and long-lasting institutional arrangements for collaborative governance of common-pool resources such as forests [13,14] Despite this clear contradiction in the current empirical literature, Ostrom's [7] institutional design principles have been widely applied in designing institutions for collaborative governance of forests around the world [10,13,15]. Furthermore, to date, the guidelines for designing each of these institutions do not exist [15].…”

“…Further current literature indicates that the institutional arrangements for collaborative governance of forests are problematic [15,25]. Power imbalances between stakeholders are a commonly noted problem in collaborative governance [26,24,2].…”

“…Common property studies of community forest management have also shown how resource management is enhanced by three characteristics: Tenure security for communities that can devise and exclude others, community rules that are easily understood and community institutions including sanctioning, conflict resolution and accountability mechanisms [15,25] Clear enforceable institutional arrangements, exclusion and alienation of natural resources are also necessary for promoting successful forestry governance outcomes [12,15].…”