NGOs come and go but business continues: lessons from co-management institutional arrangements for governance of the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve in Kenya

Abstract

The objective of this paper is to examine the current institutional arrangements for governance of the Arabuko-Sokoke Forest Reserve (ASFR) and show their major contribution in the ASFR comanagement business of conserving the forest and providing livelihoods to the poor forestdependent communities. Despite the fact that funding from non-governmental organizations ended, the ASFR co-management business did not stall. The institutional arrangements for comanagement were deemed to be the major component that contributed to the continuation of the ASFR co-management business. To demonstrate this hypothesis, the paper explores four main areas that shape the institutional arrangement of the ASFR co-management regime, informed by common property theories: (1) how governance arrangement structures for the ASFR are organized; (2) villagers perceptions and awareness of the co-management structure; (3) comanagement arrangement for access, ownership and use of the various forest resources; and (4) importance of the forest resources to the households. The co-management piloting and nonpiloting communities adjacent to the forest and who have been depending on the forest as a source of their livelihoods are compared in order to understand the role of the ASFR comanagement institutional arrangements in the sustainability of its business

Designing Institutional Arrangements for Collaborative Governance of Forests in Kenya Using a Delphi Process

“…Formalization of collaborative governance structures for all the stakeholders is also an important collaborative governance institutional design feature [2] (continuous engagement with local forest adjacent community members [2]. Clear 7 15,25,12]. Never the less, it is prudent to argue that all the 52 raised issues in designing institutional arrangements for collaborative governance are important in designing intuitional arrangements for collaborative governance.…”

“…Further current literature indicates that the institutional arrangements for collaborative governance of forests are problematic [15,25]. Power imbalances between stakeholders are a commonly noted problem in collaborative governance [26,24,2].…”

“…Common property studies of community forest management have also shown how resource management is enhanced by three characteristics: Tenure security for communities that can devise and exclude others, community rules that are easily understood and community institutions including sanctioning, conflict resolution and accountability mechanisms [15,25] Clear enforceable institutional arrangements, exclusion and alienation of natural resources are also necessary for promoting successful forestry governance outcomes [12,15].…”

“…Despite these glaring gaps in literature the Kenyan government is currently working on collaborative forest management intending to conserve the forest at the same time deliver sustainable livelihoods to the poor communities depended on the forest for their subsistence goods and services [30,31,25]. Many countries have now developed, or are in the process of developing changes to national policies and legislation that institutionalise collaborative governance.…”

Forest Management Teams, a Citizenship Paradigm Analysis through Influence and Importance Factors; Experience from Arabuko Sokoke Forest, Kenya

“…Organization in Box C with the importance of the rank level of 4 and influence rank level of 4 may result in its impact not being felt unless it outshines in implementing an activity that is of significant value to the Team, or the project and is picked up by the Team supervisor or very influential partners. Ming'ate et al (2014) found that the communities felt that the government had not given them enough powers to manage and utilize resources (Box C). However, the PFM participating communities felt that they have right (Box B) of access to products through guidelines and agreements (Ming'ate et al, 2014).…”