Postponement and recuperation in cohort marriage: The experience of South Korea

Cohort fertility decline in low fertility countries: Decomposition using parity progression ratios

“…The traditional expectations about women's role in the family made it difficult for women to continue working after marriage, despite their increasing education and employment opportunities. This growing conflict between career opportunities and family life expectations resulted in a rising rate of nonmarriage (and childlessness), especially among highly educated women (Jones and Gubhaju 2009;Tsuya 2015;Yoo 2016).…”

Ultra-low fertility in South Korea: The role of the tempo effect

“…This estimate ranks Korea, alongside Japan, Italy, and Spain, among countries with the lowest cohort fertility globally (Myrskylä, Goldstein, and Cheng 2013). This change in fertility behavior proceeded in parallel with a shift away from universal marriage, since a rising share of women born in the 1970s remained unmarried in their late thirties (Yoo 2016;Kim and Yoo 2016).…”

“…Recently, marriage rates have declined across the region and women and men increasingly remain single well into their thirties. Rates of never getting married have also increased considerably (Jones and Gubhaju 2009;Rindfuss and Choe 2015;Yoo 2016). As births out of wedlock remain rare and childbearing is still exclusively linked to marriage across the region, a decline in nuptiality implies fewer births and contributes strongly to the emergence of ultra-low fertility in East Asia.…”

The influence of housing on family size in South Korea: Unstable housing and parity specific risk

“…Controlling for the employment status of females is necessary because this study assumes that females are the primary caregivers and out-of-wedlock births are rare in Korea. Unlike previous studies that analyze fertility outcomes depending on educational attainment and income (Jones & Urasawa, 2014;Yoo, 2016), this paper focuses on residential determinants and postponement of fertility by controlling for other socio-economic factors.…”

“…Actual fertility outcomes in Korea show a substantial mismatch with fertility desires which is about two children even when TFR was 1.2 in 2011 (Korean General Social Survey, 2012),. Recent studies highlight an increase in the age of first marriage and a trend of remaining as single, influenced by the economic conditions: unaffordable housing costs, weak public pension plans, and high childrearing costs (Kwon, 2007;Yoo, 2016). Instead of devoting lifetime resources to childrearing and ensuing costs, young generations in Korea tend to allocate more financial resources to homeownership (Lee & Choi, 2015).…”