Post-Totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic

Abstract

A good deal has been heard in recent years concerning the “liberation” of peoples living under totalitarian rule, but the question of who are the men who succeed to the leadership of a state after the fall of its totalitarian rulers has received relatively little attention. Such observations as have been made on the subject, whether by political opponents of a totalitarian regime or by professional social scientists, have tended to follow implicitly—if not explicitly—the theory of alternating elites. There is assumed to be, on the one hand, a more or less homogeneous totalitarian elite, and, on the other, an actual or potential counter-elite, representing the political antithesis to the totalitarian elite. The stability of the rule of the former is said to vary inversely with the degree of organization of the latter. The totalitarian elite is variously identified with the holders of high positions in the totalitarian system, with the “responsible leaders,” with an entire ruling class, or simply with those individuals who are said to be influential in the determination of national policy. The counter-elite is identified with the active overt and covert opponents of the totalitarian elite—resistance leaders, the “vanguard of the proletariat,” prominent exiles, and “men on whose backs in concentration camps the lash has written the new gospel in blood and tears.” Both elite and counter-elite are thus seen as directly, actively involved in the totalitarian system, either as its leaders or as its opponents.Revolution, in this schema, is identified with the destruction of the totalitarian elite and its replacement by the counter-elite. Or, conversely, the destruction of the totalitarian elite is an act of revolution and will result in the emergence of the counter-elite to power. It is an attractively simple thesis, and it warrants investigation.

Elite integration in stable democracies: a reconsideration*

“…In so far as this kind of elite structure is a precondition of stable democracy, its existence in West Germany is important evidence that the country has by now joined the ranks of other, well-established Western democracies such as the US and Australia. Debate over the character and democratic proclivities of the West German elite has been a recurrent theme in discussions of the country's politics since its formation after the demise ofNazism (see, inter alia, Edinger, 1960;Zapf, 1965;Dahrendorf, 1967;Wildenmann, 1975). While we do not elaim that our data are conc1usive on this question, our finding that West German national elite structure and functioning in the 1980s differs in no fundamental way from its American and Australian counterparts is one more indication of the stability of West German democracy.…”

I. Das deutsche Problem im Alten Reich

“…L'affaissement du taux de natalité en France -il s'établit à 21,9% pour la moyenne annuelle des années 1896-1900 -alors que le taux de mortalité ne baisse qu'assez lentement -20,5 % pour la moyenne des mêmes années -ne lui laisse qu'un accroissement naturel très faible 17 . Certes, des voix manifestent une inquiétude face à ce déclin démographique aux graves conséquences économiques et militaires sans pour autant secouer l'indifférence des gouvernements 18 . Pays d'immigration, le France compte 1037800 étrangers en 1901 soit 2,6% de la population totale.…”

“…Insbesondere hat er die Bedeutung der wirtschaftlichen Kriegsziele Frankreichs hervorgehoben, die in der Vorkriegszeit wurzelten, sich 1916 herauskristallisierten, um von da an bis zu den Vertragsverhandlungen unverändert zu bleiben. Außerdem hat seine Arbeit das Verdienst, die Bedeutung der wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit der Alliierten zu betonen und die Hoffnungen Frankreichs auf eine Fortsetzung dieser wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit im Frieden und in der Vertragsausführung zu unterstreichen; diese Hoffnungen sollten sich freilich als illusionär herausstellen 18 nach Italien geliefert werden, und Luxemburg, das aus der Zollunion mit dem Reich ausschied, sollte die gleichen Mengen wie vor dem Krieg erhalten. Schließlich ist, um diese Zusammenfassung zu vervollständigen, Oberschlesien nicht zu vergessen, dessen Schicksal noch zu entscheiden war.…”

“…Elder statesman Léon Bourgeois warned: "England whose vital interests ... depend above all on the United States will always tend to model its policy on American policy .. .England ... will find in American attitudes a pretext for slowing down cooperation with us in the application of the treaty" 17 . German American financiers were rumoured to be plotting against reparations, supported by a "mischievous or insufficiently informed press intent on exciting the naive pity of Americans for poor Germany" 18 . Anglo-American affinity and cooperation, however, was one thing, ganging-up against France another.…”

“…17 Bibliothèque nationale, Paris, Fonds Millerand, 70M, note of April 1921. 18 Ministère des affaires étrangères, Papiers Millerand, 19, Jusserand (Washington), 29 November…”