Post-hoc User Traceability Analysis in Electronic Toll Pricing Systems

Chen, Xihui; Fonkwe, David; Pang, Jun

doi:10.1007/978-3-642-35890-6_3

Cited by 3 publications

(8 citation statements)

References 22 publications

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“…To the best of our knowledge supported by the survey [24], the work [7] is the only relevant study that proposes an attack concerning the post-payment PPETC schemes. In [7], the authors present an attack to find drivers' possible traces in a toy example of an ETC system. A trace is a set of trips a driver has made within a billing period.…”

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The adversary uses an attack that works based on solving the SSP whose solutions lead to a driver's set of traces where the correct trace is located. To solve the SSP, [7] utilizes Pisinger's algorithm [33] due to its linear computation time. However, it is important to note that the values corresponding to the set of traces must adhere to specific restrictions.…”

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…By analyzing the effect of different parameter settings on the SSP's complexity, we obtain valuable insights into selecting parameter settings that can enhance privacy. The presented attack in [7] is just applied to a toy scenario using the synthetic data within a billing period of 10 days, and the authors do not discuss how their evaluation results can be applied to a real-world scenario. We emphasize that the attack in [7] relies on a very strong assumption (which is not justifiable according to [20,37] with respect to our setting).…”

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…The presented attack in [7] is just applied to a toy scenario using the synthetic data within a billing period of 10 days, and the authors do not discuss how their evaluation results can be applied to a real-world scenario. We emphasize that the attack in [7] relies on a very strong assumption (which is not justifiable according to [20,37] with respect to our setting). Therefore, we cannot regard it as a suitable baseline for the purpose of benchmarking.…”

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 3 more Smart Citations

Why Privacy-Preserving Protocols Are Sometimes Not Enough: A Case Study of the Brisbane Toll Collection Infrastructure

Adavoudi Jolfaei,

Rupp,

Schiffner

et al. 2024

PoPETs

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The use of Electronic Toll Collection (ETC) systems is on the rise, as these systems have a significant impact on reducing operational costs. Toll service providers (TSPs) access various information, including drivers' IDs and monthly toll fees, to bill drivers. While this is legitimate, such information could be misused for other purposes violating drivers' privacy, most prominent, to infer drivers' movement patterns. To this end, privacy-preserving ETC (PPETC) schemes have been designed to minimize the amount of information leaked while still allowing drivers to be charged. We demonstrate that merely applying such PPETC schemes to current ETC infrastructures may not ensure privacy. This is due to the (inevitable) minimal information leakage, such as monthly toll fees, which can potentially result in a privacy breach when combined with additional background information, such as road maps and statistical data. To show this, we provide a counterexample using the case study of Brisbane's ETC system. We present two attacks: the first, being a variant of the presence disclosure attack, tries to disclose the toll stations visited by a driver during a billing period as well as the frequency of visits. The second, being a stronger attack, aims to discover cycles of toll stations (e.g., the ones passed during a commute from home to work and back) and their frequencies. We evaluate the success rates of our attacks using real parameters and statistics from Brisbane's ETC system. In one scenario, the success rate of our toll station disclosure attack can be as high as 94%. This scenario affects about 61% of drivers. In the same scenario, our cycle disclosure attack can achieve a success rate of 51%. It is remarkable that these high success rates can be achieved by only using minimal information as input, which is, e.g., available to a driver's payment service provider or bank, and by following very simple attack strategies without exploiting optimizations. As a further contribution, we analyze how the choice of various parameters, such as the set of toll rates, the number of toll stations, and the billing period length, impact a driver's privacy level regarding our attacks.

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Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Attacks On Privacy In Etcmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Why Privacy-Preserving Protocols Are Sometimes Not Enough: A Case Study of the Brisbane Toll Collection Infrastructure

Adavoudi Jolfaei,

Rupp,

Schiffner

et al. 2024

PoPETs

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…However, such a solution raises another threat after payment information finishes. Chen et al [ 11 ] claimed that this information can be cracked by an external malicious attacker. Therefore, post hoc analysis concerning user traceability based on a user toll payment information scheme has been proposed by them.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy-Preserving Smart Road-Pricing System with Trustworthiness Evaluation in VANETs

Zhu

Ji²,

Shen

et al. 2021

Sensors

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With the advanced development of the intelligent transportation system, vehicular ad hoc networks have been observed as an excellent technology for the development of intelligent traffic management in smart cities. Recently, researchers and industries have paid great attention to the smart road-tolling system. However, it is still a challenging task to ensure geographical location privacy of vehicles and prevent improper behavior of drivers at the same time. In this paper, a reliable road-tolling system with trustworthiness evaluation is proposed, which guarantees that vehicle location privacy is secure and prevents malicious vehicles from tolling violations at the same time. Vehicle route privacy information is encrypted and uploaded to nearby roadside units, which then forward it to the traffic control center for tolling. The traffic control center can compare data collected by roadside units and video surveillance cameras to analyze whether malicious vehicles have behaved incorrectly. Moreover, a trustworthiness evaluation is applied to comprehensively evaluate the multiple attributes of the vehicle to prevent improper behavior. Finally, security analysis and experimental simulation results show that the proposed scheme has better robustness compared with existing approaches.

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Reliable and Secure Distributed Smart Road Pricing System for Smart Cities

Bouchelaghem

Omar

2019

IEEE Trans. Intell. Transport. Syst.

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Vehicular networks have emerged as a promising technology for the development of traffic management systems in smart cities. They are expected to revolutionize a variety of applications such as traffic monitoring and pay-as-you-drive services. Recently, the notion of road pricing has become crucial in most big cities as it contributes in road congestion avoidance, fuel consumption saving and pollution reduction. However, as the road pricing systems need trip data to invoice citizens, it is vital to ensure geolocation privacy while keeping drivers honest. In this paper, we propose a security approach for Smart Road Pricing (SRP) systems, which prevents toll evasion violations. The proposed approach operates under a fully distributed thresholdbased control system to detect fraudulent drivers trying to cheat on their tolls. The accused drivers are reported to the toll server in order to take the appropriate countermeasures. Through the security analysis, we show the robustness of the proposed approach against a range of potential attacks. We also evaluate the proposed approach through simulations considering important metrics, namely, the storage and communication overheads. The proposed approach shows better performance results in comparison to the existing approaches. Furthermore, we evaluate the proposed approach efficiency in terms of detection precision, where it demonstrates promising results.

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Post-hoc User Traceability Analysis in Electronic Toll Pricing Systems

Cited by 3 publications

References 22 publications

Why Privacy-Preserving Protocols Are Sometimes Not Enough: A Case Study of the Brisbane Toll Collection Infrastructure

Why Privacy-Preserving Protocols Are Sometimes Not Enough: A Case Study of the Brisbane Toll Collection Infrastructure

Privacy-Preserving Smart Road-Pricing System with Trustworthiness Evaluation in VANETs

Reliable and Secure Distributed Smart Road Pricing System for Smart Cities

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