Reliable and Secure Distributed Smart Road Pricing System for Smart Cities

Bouchelaghem, Siham; Omar, Mawloud

doi:10.1109/tits.2018.2842754

Cited by 25 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 26 publications

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“…They discussed the relationship between the autonomous driving level, marginal travel price, and road capacity, while other works have discussed the drivers' privacy and malicious vehicle detection in congestion pricing systems. Bouchelaghem et al [20] proposed a reliable and secure road pricing system, which detects evasive drivers that avoid paying the toll. The proposed method works under a complete distributed threshold-based control system to reveal dishonest drivers that are trying to avoid paying their tolls.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

T-Coin: Dynamic Traffic Congestion Pricing System for the Internet of Vehicles in Smart Cities

et al. 2020

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Alleviating traffic congestion is one of the main challenges for the Internet of Vehicles (IoV) in smart cities. Many congestion pricing systems have been proposed recently. However, most of them focus on punishing the vehicles that use certain roads during peak hours, neglecting the proven fact that rewards can encourage drivers to follow the rules. Therefore, in this paper, we propose a new congestion pricing system based on reward and punishment policies for the IoV in a smart city environment, where the vehicles are rewarded for voluntarily choosing to take an alternative path to alleviate traffic congestion. The proposed system is implemented using vehicular ad hoc networks, which eliminate the need for installing a costly electronic toll collection system. We propose a new virtual currency called T-Coin (traffic coin), that is used to reward the vehicles for their positive attitude. T-Coin is also used in the tender between vehicles to manage the road reservation process. The proposed system uses dynamic pricing to adapt to peak-hour traffic congestion. Using simulated traffic on a real map of Beijing city, we prove the usefulness of T-Coin as a traffic congestion pricing system.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

T-Coin: Dynamic Traffic Congestion Pricing System for the Internet of Vehicles in Smart Cities

et al. 2020

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“…is the optimal social cost when using a fixed price. Then the regret (12) models the difference between the social cost when selecting a sequence of incentive prices {p t } T t=1 and optimal social cost from using a fixed price p * s for each s. In the following, we characterize the mechanism design proposed for one-way communication by analyzing the regret (12). In particular, we analyze the regret (12) by showing that it satisfies Hannan consistency, i.e., lim sup…”

Section: A Incentive Mechanism Design Without Privacy Guaranteementioning

confidence: 99%

“…The intuition of the approaches belonging to this category is to serve more passengers using less vehicles so that the congestion can be mitigated. Typical strategies include ridesharing [7], [8], L. Niu {lniu,aclark}@wpi.edu alternative travel options (e.g., bicycle/pedestrian) [9], and pricing scheme design [10]- [12].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Differentially Private and Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Traffic Offload to Public Transportation

Niu

Clark

2018

Lecture Notes in Computer Science

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Increasingly large trip demands have strained urban transportation capacity, which consequently leads to traffic congestion. In this work, we focus on mitigating traffic congestion by incentivizing passengers to switch from private to public transit services. We address the following challenges. First, the passengers incur inconvenience costs when participating in traffic offload due to delay and discomfort, and thus need to be reimbursed. The inconvenience cost, however, is unknown to the government when choosing the incentives. Furthermore, participating in traffic offload raises privacy concerns from passengers. An adversary could infer personal information, (e.g., daily routine, region of interest, and wealth), by observing the decisions made by the government, which are known to the public. We adopt the concept of differential privacy and propose privacy-preserving incentive designs under two settings, denoted as two-way communication and one-way communication. Under two-way communication, we focus on how the government should reveal passengers' inconvenience costs to properly incentivize them while preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a mixed integer linear program, and propose a polynomial-time approximation algorithm. We show the proposed approach achieves truthfulness, individual rationality, social optimality, and differential privacy. Under one-way communication, we focus on how the government should design the incentives without revealing passengers' inconvenience costs while still preserving differential privacy. We formulate the problem as a convex program, and propose a differentially private and near-optimal solution algorithm. A numerical case study using Caltrans Performance Measurement System (PeMS) data source is presented as evaluation. arXiv:1906.01683v1 [cs.CY] 4 Jun 2019integer linear program. We propose an efficient approximation algorithm to reduce the computation complexity. • We prove that the proposed mechanism design under two-way communication achieves approximate optimal social welfare, truthfulness, individual rationality, and differential privacy. • For the one-way communication, we formulate the problem as an online convex program. We give a polynomialtime algorithm to solve for the mechanism design. We prove that the proposed mechanism is differentially private and Hannan consistent. • We present a numerical case study with real-world trace data as evaluation. The results show that the proposed approach achieves individual rationality and non-negative social welfare, and is privacy preserving. The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We discuss the related works in Section II. In Section III, we present the problem formulation under two-way and one-way communication settings, respectively. We present the proposed incentive mechanism design in Section IV for the two-way communication setting. Section V gives the proposed solution for one-way communication setting. The proposed approaches are demonstrated using a numerical case study in Sectio...

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“…Vehicular ad hoc networks (VANETs) have attracted keen interest from researchers and industries [ 1 , 2 , 3 ]. VANETs have been studied in depth over recent years, which has contributed to the construction of smart traffic networks in smart cities.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Privacy-Preserving Smart Road-Pricing System with Trustworthiness Evaluation in VANETs

Zhu

Ji²,

Shen

et al. 2021

Sensors

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With the advanced development of the intelligent transportation system, vehicular ad hoc networks have been observed as an excellent technology for the development of intelligent traffic management in smart cities. Recently, researchers and industries have paid great attention to the smart road-tolling system. However, it is still a challenging task to ensure geographical location privacy of vehicles and prevent improper behavior of drivers at the same time. In this paper, a reliable road-tolling system with trustworthiness evaluation is proposed, which guarantees that vehicle location privacy is secure and prevents malicious vehicles from tolling violations at the same time. Vehicle route privacy information is encrypted and uploaded to nearby roadside units, which then forward it to the traffic control center for tolling. The traffic control center can compare data collected by roadside units and video surveillance cameras to analyze whether malicious vehicles have behaved incorrectly. Moreover, a trustworthiness evaluation is applied to comprehensively evaluate the multiple attributes of the vehicle to prevent improper behavior. Finally, security analysis and experimental simulation results show that the proposed scheme has better robustness compared with existing approaches.

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Reliable and Secure Distributed Smart Road Pricing System for Smart Cities

Cited by 25 publications

References 26 publications

T-Coin: Dynamic Traffic Congestion Pricing System for the Internet of Vehicles in Smart Cities

T-Coin: Dynamic Traffic Congestion Pricing System for the Internet of Vehicles in Smart Cities

A Differentially Private and Truthful Incentive Mechanism for Traffic Offload to Public Transportation

Privacy-Preserving Smart Road-Pricing System with Trustworthiness Evaluation in VANETs

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