Positioning Accountability in European Governance: An Introduction

Curtin, Deirdre; Mair, Peter; Papadopoulos, Yannis

doi:10.1080/01402382.2010.485862

Cited by 40 publications

(22 citation statements)

References 37 publications

(27 reference statements)

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“…Applying this question to the supranational level needs an understanding of the conceptual bases and the essence of the methods applied to national systems. As the comprehensive study of corruption and integrity at EU-level is sparse, with few exceptions looking into the role of the EU's Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) from a principle-agent perspective (Brandt & Svendsen 2013) or looking into ethics rules a (Demmke et al 2007), this study of the EU-level integrity system (EUIS) drew mostly on the NIS framework and its previous findings, enriched by academic debates accountability in European governance (for an overview see by Curtin et. al 2010) and ongoing public discussions on EU integrity, transparency and accountability.…”

Section: Conceptualising the European Union Integrity Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Square pegs and round holes? Challenges in assessing the EU-level integrity system

Perera¹,

Patz²

2018

Preprint

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Final study published as Perera et al. (2014) -see methodological annex.2 Abstract (as originally submitted)For over a decade now, Transparency International (TI) has undertaken National Integrity System (NIS) assessments to determine a country's effectiveness in fighting corruption, making recommendations for institutional or policy reform. The NIS approach evaluates key 'pillars' in a country's governance system, both in terms of their internal corruption risks and their contribution to fighting corruption in society at large, highlighting, amongst others, rules and practices regarding transparency and accountability. The TI EU Office has now embarked upon an assessment of the EU-level integrity system (EUIS) based upon the NIS methodology and focused around EU institutions. The difficulties in transposing this approach to the EU-level encompass a number of normative, analytical and empirical questions.The lack of a normative framework for a supranational system poses a particular challenge to the adaptation of the traditional methodology to the EU reality. While the NIS begins from accepted notions of an well-functioning liberal, democratic nation state, the development of the EU -through compromises between competing national interests, the gradual codification of residual practices and norms, and not least, internal institutional power plays -has led to an institutional system where traditional state functions are frequently shared, combined, blurred or at worst, absent. Mapping existing competences in the integrity system and identifying where critical roles -e.g. oversight or accountability relationships -might best lay are both normatively and analytically challenging.Further difficulties arise in identifying and delimiting research subjects beyond the core EU institutions. Alongside public institutions, the NIS methodology also evaluates non-state actors with roles in the integrity system -namely, the media, civil society, and the private sector. Settling upon satisfyingly comprehensive definitions of these actors at the EU level without entering into an analysis of 28 national systems needs careful consideration.Thus, the research is faced with the need to define where the national integrity systems end and the EU-level integrity system begins. This can be encapsulated in the question of what ethics rules should reasonably apply to a national diplomat or politician exercising duties within the Council: should there be a 'double-regime' for example, and if so, how could this be implemented effectively? How can integrity and corruption risks at the EU-level be captured adequately within the methodological framework and how can questions and empirical lines of enquiry be adapted accordingly? This paper will explore the nature of these challenges, the solutions reached, and lessons learned at a mid-point of the study.3

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Section: Conceptualising the European Union Integrity Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

Square pegs and round holes? Challenges in assessing the EU-level integrity system

Perera¹,

Patz²

2018

Preprint

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Government accountability is conventionally taken to be established via regular, free and fair elections in which incumbents are ousted when the populace deems their performance unsatisfactory (Curtin et al 2010;Montanaro 2012;Kröger and Friedrich 2013). In lamenting the role and power in EU policy-making of unelected executive agents and indirectly elected European parliamentarians, much of the existing literature on the EU's democratic deficit falls into this traditional framework.…”

Section: New Understandings Of Representation and Liberal Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

“…This new literature is premised on the view that 'a range of actors (…), elected as well as unelected ones, may succeed in making effective representative claims' (Saward 2014: 731;Montanaro 2012). This line of argument is particularly relevant when the traditional territorial state -in which the standard view of electoral accountability and legitimacy has greatest validity -is challenged (Curtin et al 2010;Lord and Pollak 2010;Olsen 2013). The European Union itself provides a salient example of such a setting, and thus is a candidate for exploration using an expanded conceptualisation of democratic legitimacy based on 'non-elective modes of representation' (Saward 2014: 733;Montanaro 2012).…”

Section: New Understandings Of Representation and Liberal Democracymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Administrative legitimacy and the democratic deficit of the European Union

Murdoch

Connolly

Kassim

2017

Journal of European Public Policy

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This article suggests a new concept of measurement for the EU's oft-alleged democratic deficit based on two contributions. First, we turn attention to the administrative staff involved in policy-making rather than the (un)accountability of EUs' parliamentarians and executive agents. Second, building on the idea that policy-makers' legitimacy depends on the extent to which they can claim to represent some groups or social interests, we assess the extent to which Commission officials' preferences reflect European citizens' policy stance. Our results indicate a statistically significant positive correlation between the policy preferences of EU administrative staff and their home country population, which, we argue, can provide EU administrators a basic degree of legitimacy relative to their home country.

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“…Several EU scholars define accountability as a social relation in which an agent is held to account for his actions to a principal (cf. Curtin, 2007Curtin, , 2009Curtin et al, 2010).…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Ex post legislative evaluation in the European Union: questioning the usage of evaluations as instruments for accountability

Zwaan

Voorst

Mastenbroek

2016

International Review of Administrative Sciences

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Evaluations may perform a key role in political systems as they provide a basis for parliaments to hold their executives accountable. This is equally the case in the European Union. Yet, several factors may work against the usage of European Union evaluations for accountability purposes. Members of the European Parliament work under great time pressure and executives may have little incentives to produce highquality evaluations. This article therefore addresses the question of to what extent and when Members of the European Parliament use ex post legislative evaluations. We present an analysis of 220 evaluations, studying how many were referred to in parliamentary questions. Our main finding is that 16% of the evaluations are followed up through questions. However, the parliamentary questions hardly serve accountability aims. Members of the European Parliament mostly use evaluations for agenda-setting purposes. The main variable explaining differences in the usage of evaluations is the level of conflict between the European Parliament and Commission during the legislative process. Points for practitionersThis article studies the usage of ex post evaluations of European Union legislation by Members of the European Parliament for accountability purposes by analysing European Parliament questions. It shows that MEPs ask different types of questions, referring to ex post evaluations. Most of the questions reveal forward-looking rather than Downloaded from backward-looking motives, aimed at agenda-setting and policy change instead of accountability. It concludes that variance in parliamentary questions about the followup of evaluation outcomes can be explained by the level of conflict between the European Parliament and Commission during the legislative stage.

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Positioning Accountability in European Governance: An Introduction

Cited by 40 publications

References 37 publications

Square pegs and round holes? Challenges in assessing the EU-level integrity system

Square pegs and round holes? Challenges in assessing the EU-level integrity system

Administrative legitimacy and the democratic deficit of the European Union

Ex post legislative evaluation in the European Union: questioning the usage of evaluations as instruments for accountability

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