Position Taking or Position Ducking? A Theory of Public Debate in Single-Party Legislatures

Abstract

<jats:p> Are representatives in authoritarian legislatures encouraged to take positions on salient issues? More generally, why do some autocracies allow public debate on hot topics at all? Understanding the dynamics of public legislative debate is important for the roles authoritarian legislatures are theorized to play in regime legitimation and information provision. I argue that the decision to allow public debate depends on autocratic incentives to mobilize public sentiment against the bureaucracy. While allowing debate on salient issues risks galvanizing antiregime sentiment, doing so may also mobilize public opinion against wayward government officials to improve performance and deflect blame. Therefore, I predict that autocrats will only allow public debate on issues they have delegated to the government. I test this using an automated content analysis of debate in the Vietnam National Assembly, with results showing evidence of position taking on salient issues, but only on issues the party delegates to the state. </jats:p>

Legislatures and Policy Making in Authoritarian Regimes

“…Finally, we believe it is noteworthy that all four articles in the special issue echo theories or empirical patterns from the literature on legislatures in democracies, including coalition governments (Noble, 2020), delegation and accountability (Schuler, 2020), gridlock (Truex, 2020), and special interests (Lü et al, 2020). In taking this approach, the articles illustrate how certain patterns of legislative politics extend beyond regime type, even if the causes and consequences of these dynamics are rooted in unique aspects of authoritarian rule.…”

“…There are too many complicated and potentially unpopular decisions for even the most personalistic autocrat to monopolize fully, and so they must delegate many policies to other elites and institutions within the regime. Schuler (2020) documents delegation of policy decisions by the Vietnamese Communist Party to nonaffiliated ministries, while Noble (2020) indicates the ability of Russia’s ministries to influence the direction of policies in their portfolios. Regarding China, both Truex (2020) and Lü et al (2020) emphasize the fragmented nature of the country’s authoritarian state, which is defined by a plethora of government bodies making and implementing policy decisions.…”

“…Second, as shown by Noble (2020), Lü et al (2020), and Truex (2020), policy processes in these institutions are often defined by competing regime actors who hold divergent preferences, and as such, these processes can be messy and inefficient, contrary to popular notions of authoritarian policy making. And third, as demonstrated by Schuler (2020) through his study of Vietnam, legislatures may be permitted to engage in open debate on delegated policy issues, with the goal of holding government officials accountable and shaping the public’s attributions of blame for poor performance.…”

Political Institutions and Coups in Dictatorships

“…They are motivated to extend their distributive networks to citizens and gather and report information from citizens to regimes to secure deputies' offices (Geddes et al, 2018). Authoritarian regimes can also use legislative debates to increase mass support toward the regime by, for example, allowing public debate on salient issues in the legislatures (Schuler, 2020) and signaling the regime's attentiveness to citizen concerns by passing a law on salient issues (Truex, 2020). In short, both ruling parties and legislatures can exert a deterrent effect on regime-changing coups as they mobilize mass support toward the regime and increase the likelihood of mass protests against attempted coups.…”

Testing the “China Model” of Meritocratic Promotions: Do Democracies Reward Less Competent Ministers Than Autocracies?

“…The key difference between democracies and autocracies is the electoral environment. In both democracies and autocracies, chief executives not only value policy cohesion and wish to minimize agency loss when choosing cabinet ministers (Lee, 2019; Martínez-Gallardo & Schleiter, 2015; Schuler, 2018; Strom, 2000) but also want to ensure that policies are enacted skillfully, such that ministers achieve the leaders’ goals and do not provoke a public backlash. However, chief executives in democracies face greater electoral pressure, which should lead to the following effects.…”