Legislatures and Policy Making in Authoritarian Regimes

Williamson, Scott; Magaloni, Beatriz

doi:10.1177/0010414020912288

Cited by 40 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 51 publications

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“…17.On the role of civil society for gender reforms, see Gelb and Palley (1996), Htun and Weldon (2012), Kang (2015), Kang and Tripp (2018), Krook (2009), Randall and Waylen (1998), Weldon (2002). On the role of legislation and policy change for bolstering elite support coalitions in dictatorships, see Gandhi, Noble, and Svolik (2019) and Magaloni and Williamson (2020)). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

International incentives for women’s rights in dictatorships

Donno

Fox

Kaasik

2021

Comparative Political Studies

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Democracy and women’s rights are integrally “bundled” by the international community. This means that dictatorships can signal adherence to international norms by demonstrating progress on gender equality, often in a manner that is consistent with the perpetuation of authoritarian rule. Using a new dataset of de jure advances in women’s rights, we show that dictatorships have vigorously enacted gender-related legislation, at a rate that surpasses democracies in the developing world. This pattern is shaped by international (Western) pressure: Among autocracies, foreign aid dependence and international nongovernmental organization shaming are associated with legal advances in women’s rights, but not with reforms in other, more politically costly areas related to elections, political competition, and repression. Our account therefore highlights selective compliance as a form of adaptation to international pressure and underscores the role of international incentives as a complement to domestic “bottom-up” pressure for women’s rights in dictatorships.

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confidence: 99%

International incentives for women’s rights in dictatorships

Donno

Fox

Kaasik

2021

Comparative Political Studies

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“…In accordance with the functionalist arguments on the tempering of opposition through including them in parliaments (Williamson and Magaloni 2020), Reuter and Robertson (2015) have found that the KPRF is susceptible to cooptation incentives, reducing its protest activities in regions where its elites control lucrative parliamentary posts. However, in contrast to the other two parliamentary opposition parties (the nationalist LDPR and the center-left Just Russia), this cooptation incentive appeared not to have affected the KPRF during the largest post-Soviet protest wave in 2011-2012 (Dollbaum 2017), suggesting that the party's public activity is a permanent balance between voice and loyalty.…”

Section: Hypothesesmentioning

confidence: 76%

“…These events offer general insights into oppositional campaigning in electoral authoritarian regimes, polities that feature liberal democratic institutions but undermine them to an extent that precludes real competition and uncertainty (Howard and Roessler 2006;Schedler 2013). There is a large literature that investigates the functions of the formally democratic institutions like elections and parliaments in these regimes (Williamson and Magaloni 2020). Equally well developed is the research on bottom-up regime change through "negative coalitions" (Beissinger 2013) that bring together disaffected citizens from various ideological and socio-economic backgrounds (Goldstone 2011).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Social Policy on Social Media: How Opposition Actors Used Twitter and VKontakte to Oppose the Russian Pension Reform

Dollbaum

2020

Problems of Post-Communism

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How do opposition actors in electoral authoritarian regimes use social media to galvanize support? Based on 2,229 social media posts, I examine how Aleksey Navalny and the Communist Party (KPRF) politicize grievances about the pension reform of 2018 and use Twitter and VKontakte for protest mobilization. I find that Navalny integrates the reform in his narrative of government corruption and theft, strategically using the platforms' different advantages. The KPRF frames less coherently and makes no distinction between VKontakte and Twitter. These differences, I argue, are mainly due to actors' different target audiences and their respective position in the authoritarian political system

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“…In authoritarian states, authorities cannot demonstrate their "weaknesses," because this would threaten the status quo and undermine their position within the system (Schuler, 2020;Williamson & Magaloni, 2020). It would be reasonable to expect that, through the lens of the NPF, we would see that winning coalitions in such authoritarian conditions, which consist mostly of governmental actors, are "obliged" to apply the angel shift strategy and portray themselves as the one and only problem-solvers or even heroes, because it is a part of their political survival.…”

Section: Hypothesis 1 In the Context Of Electoral Authoritarianism Actors Opposing The Reform Will Tend Tomentioning

confidence: 99%

Narratives in an authoritarian environment: Narrative strategies, plots, and characters in Moscow’s public transport reforms debate

Uldanov

Gabriichuk

Каратеев

et al. 2021

European Policy Analysis

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This article draws on the Narrative Policy Framework (NPF) to analyze the recent debates over Moscow's public transport policy. Despite a proliferation of NPF implementations in recent years, applications in authoritarian institutional settings remain rare. We seek to fill this gap by examining how the actors combine narrative strategies, characters, and plots to advocate their vision of public transport development in Moscow. To this end, this study tests NPF meso-level hypotheses on narrative strategies and their connections with plots and characters used in the context of Russian electoral authoritarian regime. The results show that the NPF hypotheses are applicable for the analysis of policy debates in an authoritarian context. While the governmental coalition uses an angel shift strategy-focusing on heroes, beneficiaries, and stories of control-to contain the scope of conflict, the opposing coalition implies a devil shift strategy with a specific attention to villains, victims, and different plots to expand the scope of conflict.

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Legislatures and Policy Making in Authoritarian Regimes

Cited by 40 publications

References 51 publications

International incentives for women’s rights in dictatorships

International incentives for women’s rights in dictatorships

Social Policy on Social Media: How Opposition Actors Used Twitter and VKontakte to Oppose the Russian Pension Reform

Narratives in an authoritarian environment: Narrative strategies, plots, and characters in Moscow’s public transport reforms debate

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