Position Taking on the President’s Agenda

What Explains a Representative’s Staffing “Style”? Exploring the Relationship between Congressional Staffing Decisions and Electoral Considerations

“…For instance, Rocca and Sanchez (2008) and Harward and Moffett (2010) show that electorally vulnerable members are more likely to cosponsor legislation relative to their more secure counterparts. In another prominent example, Byers and Shay (2019) find that electorally vulnerable members are less likely to abstain on roll call votes. This vein of research argues that vulnerable members focus on their lawmaking duties in Washington D.C. because they do not wish to be perceived by their constituents as shirking their legislative responsibilities.…”

“…There is a well-develop body of works which shows that electorally vulnerable members are concerned about being perceived as incompetent or shirking their responsibilities, thus, they devote greater attention to their legislative duties (e.g., Arnold 1990; Byers and Shay 2019; Cahill & Stone, 2018). For instance, Rocca and Sanchez (2008) and Harward and Moffett (2010) show that electorally vulnerable members are more likely to cosponsor legislation relative to their more secure counterparts.…”