Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence

Golder, Sona N.; Thomas, Jacquelyn A.

doi:10.1017/s0007123412000580

Cited by 14 publications

(14 citation statements)

References 23 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Unclassified

Order By: Relevance

“… On presidential regimes, see Amorim Neto (), Amorim Neto and Samuels (), and Indridason (). On subnational French governments, see Golder and Thomas (). On European cabinets facing weak confidence requirements, see Bucur and Rasch (). …”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99

Akirav

Cox

2018

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article, we examine bonuses garnered by government formateurs in all European democracies that began the 20th century as constitutional monarchies. Using a new data set on how portfolios were allocated in each democratic coalition cabinet formed 1901–99, we show that formateurs’ bonuses were positive and significant when the monarch still exercised discretion in choosing them but declined after the monarch’s role was constrained. Relatedly, Gamson’s Law was more strongly violated when monarchs played a larger role. After identifying the dates at which monarchs were constrained, we conduct a difference‐in‐differences analysis, comparing formateurs’ bonuses in each reformed country with those in otherwise similar countries that did not reform at the same time. The results support the hypothesis that greater royal discretion engendered larger formateurs’ bonuses.

show abstract

mentioning

confidence: 99%

The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99

Akirav

Cox

2018

Legislative Studies Qtrly

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Focusing on trying to explain this party-size paradox, Indridason (2015) suggest that the formateur will over-compensate the minor coalition partner, thus ensuring loyalty to that coalition. Golder and Thomas (2014) suggest that the presence of a vote of no-confidence explains small-party overpayment because the threat of no-confidence provides "an incentive for large formateur parties to overcompensate smaller coalition partners in exchange for their sustained support over time" (Golder and Thomas 2014, 1).…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

Bargaining in legislatures, portfolio allocation, and the electoral costs of governing

Martin

2018

West European Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

What motivates political parties in the legislative arena? Existing legislative bargaining models stress parties' office and policy motivations. A particularly important question concerns how parties in coalition government agree the distribution of cabinet seats. We add to this portfolio allocation literature by suggesting that future electoral considerations affect bargaining over the allocation of cabinet seats in multi-party cabinets. Some parties are penalized by voters for participating in government, increase the attractiveness of staying in opposition. This "cost of governing" shifts their seat reservation price-the minimum cabinet seats demanded in return for joining the coalition. Results of a randomized survey experiment of Irish legislators support our expectation, demonstrating that political elites are sensitive to future electoral losses when contemplating the distribution of cabinet seats. This research advances our understanding of how parties' behavior between elections is influenced by anticipation of voters' reaction.

show abstract

“…Verzichelli (2008) points out the institutional effect of the vote of no confidence, the power of a prime minister, and the relationship between the two chambers. Recently, Golder, Thomas et al (2014) have regarded the vote of no confidence as important in explaining the gap between theoretical prediction and empirical patterns. They point out that the existence of the vote of no confidence forces large parties to concede cabinet portfolios to small parties and leads to disproportionality in cabinet portfolio allocations.…”

Section: The Role Of Bicameralism In Coalition Bargainingmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impact of bicameralism on the disproportionality of cabinet portfolio allocation

Kubo

2016

Japanese Political Science Review

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

This study examines whether bicameralism affects cabinet composition in parliamentary democracy. While previous studies have examined the effect of bicameralism on the legislative process and cabinet duration, little is known about its effect on cabinet post allocation. Therefore, this study examines how and why the institutional and partisan strengths of upper chambers affect the outcome of coalition bargaining and post allocation. Theoretically, I argue that partisan strength in upper chambers enhances a party's bargaining position, resulting in disproportionality between the party seat and cabinet portfolio share of the lower chamber in coalition governments. The empirical results indicate that the level of disproportionality in cabinet portfolio allocation is higher in countries with strong upper chambers than in countries with weak or no upper chambers. I also investigate party level data in countries with strong upper chambers. After controlling for the party share of lower chambers in these countries, the advantage accrued by the upper chamber in terms of party seat share is likely to result in obtaining a higher share of cabinet portfolios.

show abstract

Portfolio Allocation and the Vote of No Confidence

Cited by 14 publications

References 23 publications

The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99

The Formateur’s Bonus in European Constitutional Monarchies, 1901–99

Bargaining in legislatures, portfolio allocation, and the electoral costs of governing

The impact of bicameralism on the disproportionality of cabinet portfolio allocation

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About