Bargaining in legislatures, portfolio allocation, and the electoral costs of governing

Martin, Shane

doi:10.1080/01402382.2018.1427946

Cited by 5 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 54 publications

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“…Another hypothesis worth exploring is whether the allocation of committee chairs is also used as a compensation mechanism for the coalition parties' anticipated future electoral losses. A survey experiment of Irish legislators illustrated that political elites are willing to compensate a party that is likely to be penalized by voters for its cabinet participation by allotting it more cabinet seats (Martin 2018).…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

Chiru

Winter

2021

Gov. & oppos.

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The appointment of committee chairs to monitor the actions of ministers belonging to coalition partners has received considerably less attention than other mechanisms of policing the coalition agreement at executive or legislative level. We take a longitudinal perspective focusing on 11 Belgian cabinets (1980–2018) to study the determinants of such appointments and whether there is a substitution effect between shadow chairs, junior ministers and coalition agreements. Our findings indicate that the probability of appointing a shadow committee chair is higher when the ideological distance between the minister's party and the coalition is larger. Other key findings are that ministers facing hostile junior ministers tend to be shadowed by committee chairs as well, while shadow chairs are also more frequent in minimum winning coalitions.

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Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

Chiru

Winter

2021

Gov. & oppos.

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“…Survey experiments have become a prominent method to identify causal relationships and isolate direct effects (Gaines et al, 2007). Although experimental methods have gained popularity in studies of bargaining and legislative voting (Druckman et al, 2014), the literature on party preferences has seldom drawn on experimental methods (see Martin, 2018).…”

Section: Research Context and Designmentioning

confidence: 99%

Policy, office and votes: An experimental investigation of the dynamic aspect of party goals

Kolltveit

2023

Scand Pol Stud

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Political parties face hard choices when balancing desires to influence public policy, to gain executive office and to win votes. The existing literature examining such party preferences has traditionally focused on rather static aspects of the parties, such as size, policy positions and the level of intraparty democracy. This article argues that party actors' sophisticated estimations of whether to enter into coalition can be affected by fluctuating public opinion, thereby having a more dynamic aspect. Drawing on a survey experiment on youth politicians in Norway, we test how perceived standing in the polls affects how politicians weigh up policy versus office and votes versus office. The experimental effect of perceived standings was investigated in addition to the respondents' positions within the party, as well as their parties' former governing history, political orientation and size. Results show that, in the presence of the treatment condition (party is perceived to do well in the polls), the preference for policy over office is lessened. We find no experimental effect for vote versus office. These results advance our understanding of the dynamic aspects of party goals and coalition formation.

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“…These theories are primarily developed and tested at the national level. In national elections, not all parties in a multi-party government are expected to share the same electoral fate (Martin 2018). Instead, the largest party in government is generally believed to be the party that will be held most to account for poor economic outcomes (Kayser and Peress 2012;Fortunato and Stevenson 2013).…”

Section: R Ementioning

confidence: 99%

Incumbents Beware: The Impact of Offshoring on Elections

Rickard

2021

Brit. J. Polit. Sci.

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How does globalization affect politics? One of the most controversial aspects of globalization is offshoring, when manufacturing operations and business functions move abroad. Although voters generally dislike offshoring, it remains unclear how moving jobs abroad impacts democratic elections. Using a difference-in-differences estimation strategy, the author finds that incumbent government parties lose more votes in municipalities where a local plant moved production abroad between elections than in municipalities that did not experience such an event. The result holds across various time periods, different incumbent parties and diverse types of elections. In both national and regional elections, voters punish incumbent government parties when a local firm moves production abroad. Incumbent parties' vote shares fall as the number of jobs lost due to offshoring increases. In multiparty governments, voters disproportionately punish the largest coalition party for offshoring. The results of an original survey administered in Spain verify the importance of offshoring for voters' retrospective evaluations of incumbents.

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Bargaining in legislatures, portfolio allocation, and the electoral costs of governing

Cited by 5 publications

References 54 publications

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

The Allocation of Committee Chairs and the Oversight of Coalition Cabinets in Belgium

Policy, office and votes: An experimental investigation of the dynamic aspect of party goals

Incumbents Beware: The Impact of Offshoring on Elections

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