Populism Around the World 2018
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-96758-5_5
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Populism in Poland

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Cited by 36 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…In response-quoting the interview of Prof. J. Szacki for "Gazeta Wyborcza" of April 23, 2004-Dzwończyk stated that now-in contrast to the 1980s-Populism in Poland is becoming dangerous, because it contests the not fully formed democratic system and calls for rebuilding of "everything" from scratch in the name of particular and often dubious reasons (Dzwończyk, 2006). In this light, the scientific discourse indicates some characteristics of contemporary Polish Populism as including: Poland's political and economic sovereignty, Euroscepticism, a positive image of the Polish nation, anti-communism, anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and xenophobia (Przyłęcki, 2012a(Przyłęcki, , 2012bStanley & Cześnik, 2019;Stępińska et al, 2017). These elements also underlie the typology of Populism 4 among Polish citizens and allow the identification of its three main forms (Jakubowska, 2004;Stępińska et al, 2017): procedural populism (assuming that specialized politicians and political parties themselves do not care about people and that people do not need politicians or political parties); sectoral populism (acceptance of "crusades" against criminals or political elites, etc., and the strong position of the Church and the state), xenophobic populism (arguing that Poland should not be a part of the European Union, and that diplomacy should specifically defend Polish political, economic and cultural sovereignty).…”
Section: Right-wing Populism As a Religious-pedagogical Challengementioning
confidence: 99%
“…In response-quoting the interview of Prof. J. Szacki for "Gazeta Wyborcza" of April 23, 2004-Dzwończyk stated that now-in contrast to the 1980s-Populism in Poland is becoming dangerous, because it contests the not fully formed democratic system and calls for rebuilding of "everything" from scratch in the name of particular and often dubious reasons (Dzwończyk, 2006). In this light, the scientific discourse indicates some characteristics of contemporary Polish Populism as including: Poland's political and economic sovereignty, Euroscepticism, a positive image of the Polish nation, anti-communism, anti-elitism, anti-intellectualism, and xenophobia (Przyłęcki, 2012a(Przyłęcki, , 2012bStanley & Cześnik, 2019;Stępińska et al, 2017). These elements also underlie the typology of Populism 4 among Polish citizens and allow the identification of its three main forms (Jakubowska, 2004;Stępińska et al, 2017): procedural populism (assuming that specialized politicians and political parties themselves do not care about people and that people do not need politicians or political parties); sectoral populism (acceptance of "crusades" against criminals or political elites, etc., and the strong position of the Church and the state), xenophobic populism (arguing that Poland should not be a part of the European Union, and that diplomacy should specifically defend Polish political, economic and cultural sovereignty).…”
Section: Right-wing Populism As a Religious-pedagogical Challengementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Nationalism's re-emergence has been facilitated by the growth of populist movements. In countries like India, Turkey, Brazil, Hungary, Poland, and the Philippines, the growing nationalist tendency is reinforced by a perception (whether imaginary or real is immaterial) that the existence of serious internal and/or external threats calls for solidarity and coalescing around a common identity (Stanley & Czesnik, 2019). In China, nationalism is centered around the perception of China's historic importance and expanding military and economic power, and cemented by the Communist party's tight grip on information and communications in society (Babones, 2019).…”
Section: Populismmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Après son arrivée au pouvoir, le PiS a pris une trajectoire de confrontation avec les institutions constitutionnelles clés qui pourraient limiter le pouvoir du parti et a rapidement mis en oeuvre des politiques attrayantes pour son électorat. Ben Stanley et Mikolaj Cześnik (2019) ont divisé le programme du parti au cours de ses deux premières années au pouvoir en trois catégories: le remplacement de l'élite; la rupture avec l'"impossibilisme" libéral en centralisant le pouvoir afin de gouverner plus librement; et l'enracinement du soutien populaire en introduisant des politiques de satisfaction des masses pour assurer la paix sociale. En bloquant la nomination de trois juges constitutionnels légitimement élus et en les remplaçant par des personnes idéologiquement proches de son programme, le PiS a ouvert la vendetta en cours contre le système judiciaire, en plaçant des membres de son parti et des personnes de confiance dans les plus hauts tribunaux, au nom de la dé-communisation.…”
Section: Les Populistes Au Pouvoirunclassified