Populism and the (Italian) crisis: The voters and the context

Abstract

This article, focusing on Italy, aims to broaden our understanding of the recent striking electoral fortunes of (differing types of) populism in the country, by locating them within multiple crises (political, economic, migration) that have shocked Europe in the last two decades. By combining individual-level survey data on voters with organizational-level interviews conducted with national and local representatives and activists of the Five Star Movement and the League, the role played by these crises in the two different Italian populisms will be disentangled from ‘demand’ and ‘supply’ perspectives – which are usually treated in isolation. The findings indicate a coherence between the political parties’ message and their respective potential voters’ orientations and attitudes (with regard to the three crises), underlining the ability of different varieties of populism to intercept (and mobilize) different grievances: whereas the economic crisis of representation is a key ingredient of both the populists’ success, the cultural crisis is more salient for the exclusionary populist League, while the political crisis is more salient for the inclusionary 5SM. For both the mobilization and representation of those citizens unsatisfied with traditional politics seems crucial. These different causes of success appear to be a useful lens through which to examine the failure of an attempt to govern by combining two differing types of populism.

The rise of anti-establishment and far-right forces in Italy: Neoliberalisation in a new guise?

“…At the same time, the success of the M5S and the League vindicated their strategies aimed at re-politicising certain key socio-economic issues, opposing national and supranational technocracies, and denouncing the de-democratisation of European integration (see Baldini and Giglioli, 2021; Caiani, 2019). Moreover, the rise of the League clearly showed its ability to capitalise upon the ‘migration crisis’ (often linking immigration with the issues of unemployment and low wages) (Caiani and Padoan, 2021) and to keep it at the centre of the political agenda, despite a continuous decline in the number of migrant arrivals (Strazzari and Grandi, 2019). The results also highlighted the existence of a fracture between the North, where entire regions were dominated by the League, and the Centre-South, where the M5S obtained a landslide victory.…”

“…Originally a Northern regionalist party that took part in all centre-right governments in recent history, it managed to repackage itself as a nationalist, anti-establishment force under the leadership of Matteo Salvini (Albertazzi et al, 2018). On immigration, the positions of the two parties converged in the run-up to the 2018 elections, with the M5S bringing its (initially only sporadic) nativist appeals more to the fore and adopting a more ‘exclusionary’ attitude, thus moving closer to the League’s aggressive anti-migration stance (see Caiani and Padoan, 2021; Pirro, 2018). Finally, both parties held strongly Eurosceptic positions, even though they never genuinely questioned EMU membership while in government (Giugliano, 2020).…”

“…In this respect, although the article primarily aims at examining the relationship between the far right and neoliberalism in the Italian context, the action of a governing coalition formed by a far-right party (the League) and an anti-establishment, yet ideologically ambiguous, political force (the M5S) will feature as a central element. Indeed, the investigation of this government’s action can provide valuable empirical insights into far-right politics and its relationship with neoliberalism not only because this executive constitutes the League’s first experience in power after its nativist/nationalist turn (Albertazzi et al, 2018) but also due to a rightward shift characterising the M5S in the run-up to the 2018 elections, especially in migration policy (Caiani and Padoan, 2021). As a second step, the article will explore the agenda of the League through an examination of the content of its 2018 electoral manifesto and public statements by League’s leader Matteo Salvini at the beginning of the Covid-19 crisis.…”

How does crisis affect the conflict between technocracy and populism? Lessons from the COVID-19 pandemic

“…This counter-reaction has, in particular, been fueled by increased reliance on technocratic management during the 2008 financial crisis (Fetzer, 2019; Mudde and Kaltwasser, 2017; Stavrakakis and Katsambekis, 2014), and economic crisis more generally (Eichengreen, 2018; Funke et al, 2016). While economic crisis remains central, the logic has been extended to immigration and the political crisis of the post-war European project (Caiani and Padoan, 2020; Pirro et al, 2018; Taggart, 2004), as well as climate change (Fraune and Knodt, 2018; Huber, 2020). The basic dynamic observed across these various crises is the prevalance of depoliticized technocratic management and governance, which have in turn been met by radical populist (re)politicization.…”

Socio-Economic and Health Management of Pandemics Based on Forgotten Effects Theory

“…In Europe, too, we saw the rise of socio-political uncertainty, for example, in France with the yellow vest protests, the welfare reform, and the terrorist attacks [4]; in Spain with the separatist movement in Catalonia and the lack of consensus informing the government [5]. The political crisis was also seen in Italy [6]; and the United Kingdom with the Brexit process [7]. All these socio-political issues that seem to be isolated end up harming the countries' economies and families' well-being and evidence a rise in risks for an entire region.…”