Populism and Constitutional Amendment

Faraguna, Pietro

doi:10.2139/ssrn.3491678

Cited by 1 publication

(1 citation statement)

References 0 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…A review of studies of populist parties, especially in authoritarian regimes, shows that the analyses pay disproportional attention to how such parties control some visible pivotal institutions such as parliament, constitutional courts, or media outlets (Faraguna, 2020;Ruth, 2017). For these institutionalist accounts, the populist parties' resiliency, especially in authoritarian countries, stems from their introduction of constitutional and legal restrictions on oppositional societal groups or parties, or on media, or their suppression of competitive electoral processes.…”

Section: Populism Institutions and Insidious Capturementioning

confidence: 99%

Populist party’s challenge to democracy: Institutional capture, performance and religion

Tepe

2021

Party Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Studies of populist parties typically focus either on discourse, policies, or institutional captures (e.g., constitutional reforms). Yet the analysis of each in isolation risks thwarting our understanding of populists’ electoral success. Discursive practices and institutional captures of populist parties are not separate processes but their successes depend on each other. The resiliency of populist parties relies not only on overt but also insidious captures. Silent, gradual captures become effective through populist performances, deployment of excluded discourses and the extension of benefits to marginalized groups. Analysis of the recent transformation of Turkey’s oldest locally elected representative institution, mukhtars, illustrates how populist policies turn nonpartisan institutions into partisan ones through insidious captures and deployment of religious discourse. While empowering some groups, expanding political discourse and access to the state, such practices also limit nonpartisan representation, and turn political questions into normative issues, exacerbating the ongoing polarization and authoritarian control of ruling parties.

show abstract

Section: Populism Institutions and Insidious Capturementioning

confidence: 99%

Populist party’s challenge to democracy: Institutional capture, performance and religion

Tepe

2021

Party Politics

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

Populism and Constitutional Amendment

Cited by 1 publication

References 0 publications

Populist party’s challenge to democracy: Institutional capture, performance and religion

Populist party’s challenge to democracy: Institutional capture, performance and religion

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About