Populist party’s challenge to democracy: Institutional capture, performance and religion

Abstract

Studies of populist parties typically focus either on discourse, policies, or institutional captures (e.g., constitutional reforms). Yet the analysis of each in isolation risks thwarting our understanding of populists’ electoral success. Discursive practices and institutional captures of populist parties are not separate processes but their successes depend on each other. The resiliency of populist parties relies not only on overt but also insidious captures. Silent, gradual captures become effective through populist performances, deployment of excluded discourses and the extension of benefits to marginalized groups. Analysis of the recent transformation of Turkey’s oldest locally elected representative institution, mukhtars, illustrates how populist policies turn nonpartisan institutions into partisan ones through insidious captures and deployment of religious discourse. While empowering some groups, expanding political discourse and access to the state, such practices also limit nonpartisan representation, and turn political questions into normative issues, exacerbating the ongoing polarization and authoritarian control of ruling parties.

Closed Ranks: The Discursive Value of Military Support for Indian Politicians on Social Media

“…This work of institutional capture must often be carried out by the induction of certain groups that wield normative power. The work most in-line with our study was done by [39], who analyzed the transformation in the role of mukhtars (the oldest locally elected representative institution in turkey) in the country's politics. Through content analysis of 50 presidential speeches to the mukhtars, they studied the themes that President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan used to justify their governance and how they convinced the mukhtars to further the party's message to their community.…”

“…Political science and policy scholars have analyzed the discursive practices used, and the policies implemented [39] by political parties (populist and non-populist) to ensure their re-election. However, not many studies have focused on the Global South.…”

Faith in Nations: The Populist Discourse of Erdogan, Modi, and Putin

“…A significant number of studies in populism literature seek to clarify the definition of "populism" and determine the best method to capture it. Despite their differences, these studies can be generally categorized into three groups that view populism as (i) a "thin" political ideology that reduces politics to a conflict between the "corrupt elite" and the "righteous people" and seeks to make the volonté générale (general will) of the people the dominant force in politics (Mudde 2004;Mudde and Kaltwasser 2012); (ii) a political strategy to leverage and mobilize support by appealing to grievances and emotions of large segments of the population (Weyland 2001;Roberts 2006;Jansen 2011;Bonikowski and Gidron 2016) or (iii) a form of political communication style, which frames social issues in a way that allows politicians or parties to present the world as an existential conflict between the people and the elites (Canovan 1999;Kazin 1998;Laclau 2005;Hawkins 2009;Taggart 2000;Jargers and Walgrave 2007;Moffitt 2018;Moffitt and Tormey 2014;Aslanidis 2016;Tepe 2021). Although the existing literature is very rich and vibrant, it still has several critical blind spots.…”

“…Stanford University Press, 2017. p. 240. 5 For an analysis of Erdo gan's populism and use of Islam, see (Tepe 2021).…”