Politics Versus Policy in Public Works Grants

Abstract

It is commonly accepted that members of Congress influence federal agencies informally, and that in turn the federal agencies strategically accommodate members of Congress. However, in recent years allegations of accommodation of congressional interests by federal agencies has been met with some skepticism. In this study I frame a critical test of the informal gains of U.S. House subcommittee members and leaders against that of substantive policy criteria in the awarding of distributive grants, specifically with respect to the Title I public works program of the Economic Development Administration during the period from 1978 to 1982. Utilizing a multinomial probit model of grant distributions to House members' districts, I find no substan tively strong or statistically significant "political benefits" for subcommittee members. However, subcommittee leaders are found to receive political benefits only during the critical test, and only enough to return the flow of grants to that which prevailed before the critical period.

Bicameralism and Geographic Politics: Allocating Funds in the House and Senate

“…Third, although surface transportation constitutes one of the largest federal distributive commitments-accounting for at least 20% of all grant-in-aid funds every year since the 1950s-it has received little attention from scholars. Political scientists interested in distributive politics have studied water projects and waste treatment construction programs (Ferejohn 1974;Strom 1975;Wilson 1986); community, urban, and economic development grants (Anagnoson 1982;Gist and Hill 1984;Hooton 1997;Plott 1968;Rich 1991); academic earmarks (Balla et al 2002;Savage 1999); and military contracts Rundquist 1999a, 1999b;Goss 1972;Mayer 1991;Rundquist 1978;Rundquist and Griffith 1976), but there has been little research into the politics of transportation. 7 After compiling a comprehensive list of all surface transportation authorizations since 1956, I compared the House-and Senate-passed versions of each bill.…”

Congressional Considerations and Urban Characteristics in the Selection of Empowerment Zones and Enterprise Communities

“…Several scholars tested the recruitment, benefit, and overrepresentation hypotheses in the House of Representatives (Arnold, 1979; Bickers & Stein, 2000; Friedland & Wong, 1983; Goss, 1972; Hooton, 2001; Ray, 1981; Strom, 1975) or both chambers of Congress (Carsey & Rundquist, 1999; Holcombe & Zardkoohi, 1981; Johnston, 1978; Rich, 1989). Arnold's (1979) research on the Model Cities program, the grandparent to the EZ/EC program, focused on bureaucratic politics to examine the connection between HUD's selection of cities during 1966 and 1967 and congressional support for program funding.…”

“…When used in conjunction with district and program variables, other researchers have discovered wide‐ranging influence from political variables in their regression models. Through their efforts, scholars have analyzed the total amount of funds received (Anagnoson, 1980; Carsey & Rundquist, 1999; Copeland & Meier, 1984; Ray, 1980b; Ritt, 1976; Strom, 1975), examined the amount of funds received from different agencies (Gist & Hill, 1984; Ritt, 1976; Ray, 1980a; Rich, 1989) and within different categories of programs (Bickers & Stein, 2000; Copeland & Meier, 1984; Johnston, 1978), studied the size of the cities (Dye & Hurley, 1978; Friedland & Wong, 1983; Gist & Hill, 1984; Rich, 1989; Saltzstein, 1977), and counted the number of projects awarded (Gist & Hill, 1984; Hooton, 2001). In the end, the influence of political variables, e.g., committee assignment and majority party status, may be advantageous when pursuing federal money.…”