Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives

Lazarus, Jeffrey

doi:10.2139/ssrn.1125288

Cited by 20 publications

(33 citation statements)

References 30 publications

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“…There are two reasons in particular to be confident in the external validity of this study. First, the results are closely consistent with other quantitative studies of similar phenomena (Evans , ; Fellowes and Wolf ; Hall and Wayman ; Lazarus ), all of which show that lobbyists’ ability to influence legislators is more likely when the risk is low that outsiders will notice. Second, the high salience of health reform legislation incentivized groups and senators to be especially cautious to avoid drawing attention to the microlegislation they were jointly developing.…”

Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

“…The literature provides numerous examples of microlegislation that allows legislators to provide private policy benefits outside of public view. Distributive earmarks appear in committee reports without ever having been voted on (Lazarus ; Lazarus and Steigerwalt ). Directives to agencies from Congress accompany legislation instead of being written into law (Evans ).…”

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

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Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

McKay

2019

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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When do campaign contributions matter? This article advances the claim that a group that gives campaign contributions to US Members of Congress is more likely to achieve legislative success when (1) a single legislator can deliver to the group (2) a private benefit (3) without attracting negative attention. Using an original data set based on the written comments of nearly 900 interest groups lobbying the US Senate Finance Committee on health reform legislation in 2009, I link group requests to corresponding legislation. The analysis shows a significant relationship between lobby groups' campaign contributions and their legislative success, and at distinct units of analysis—the group, the side, and the group‐senator dyad. The relationship is particularly strong in predicting senators’ amendments in committee. The rare data presented here offer compelling evidence that interest groups' legislative victories are sometimes connected to campaign contributions in a way that previous studies could not identify.

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Section: Discussionsupporting

confidence: 88%

Section: Theorymentioning

confidence: 99%

Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

McKay

2019

Legislative Studies Qtrly

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“…The growing literature on earmarks has, for various reasons, typically examined just a single type of earmark (e.g., Balla et al's, 2002, analysis of academic earmarks and Lee's, 2003, study of projects included in the 1998 transportation authorization bill) or pooled all earmarks irrespective of the appropriations bill in which the project was included (e.g., Engstrom & Vanberg, 2010;Lazarus, 2009Lazarus, , 2010Lazarus & Steigerwalt, 2009;Shepsle et al, 2009). The primary interest of these research endeavors was to uncover broad partisan and/or electoral dynamics affecting the allocation of earmarks.…”

Section: Distributive and Partisan Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Although some studies have accounted for the fact that cardinals should do better (see, for example, Lazarus, 2010), the linkage is rarely, if ever, made to the specific subcommittee of interest. 5 Our argument is that, if subcommittees are the locus of decision making, then it is subcommittee chairs and their minority party counterparts (the ranking members) as well as, to a somewhat lesser extent, ordinary subcommittee members who should secure the most pork.…”

Section: Distributive and Partisan Politicsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Earmarks and Subcommittee Government in the U.S. Congress

Clemens

Crespin

Finocchiaro

2015

American Politics Research

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In recent years, considerable scholarly attention has focused on earmarks, the quintessential example of pork barrel politics. We assess the degree to which existing theories can explain the distribution of earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives. First, drawing on informal interviews with individuals on Capitol Hill regarding the earmark process, we argue that assessing institutional and constituency-level factors that affect the earmark receipts of individual members requires examination at the level of the Appropriations subcommittees. Second, we demonstrate that both distributive and partisan theories of legislative organization are applicable to the distribution of earmarks. Finally, we present results indicating that contrary to the conventional wisdom, most subcommittees do not distribute pork based on electoral vulnerability. Rather, legislators' status in the appropriations process has the most influence. These findings offer insights into the path forward as debate continues over congressionally directed spending.

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“…Therefore, this analysis examines House members' actions on behalf of women's groups, regardless of solicitation. Though the district-level variables would seem pertinent to funding requests, some preliminary work indicates such requests are not a function of local demand (Lazarus 2008). This suggests women's groups may target whomever they feel is more supportive and, conversely, a representative will not feel pressured to request funding simply because a women's group exists in his or her district.…”

Section: The Difference Gender Makesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Women, Earmarks, and Substantive Representation

Schulze

2013

Journal of Women, Politics & Policy

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The purpose of this article is to demonstrate women's substantive impact on government by examining the earmark requests of the US House representatives. Women representatives are hypothesized to make more funding requests for women's issues than male representatives. Through use of OLS statistical analysis, women's issue earmark requests, as reported by the 111th congressional House members for the fiscal year 2010, serve as the dependent variable. Gender is a significant predictor of earmark requests even when controlling for the ideology, partisanship, and racial minority status of a House member. This finding is evidence of women's substantive representation in the form of earmark requests.

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Giving the People What They Want? The Distribution of Earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives

Cited by 20 publications

References 30 publications

Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

Buying Amendments? Lobbyists' Campaign Contributions and Microlegislation in the Creation of the Affordable Care Act

Earmarks and Subcommittee Government in the U.S. Congress

Women, Earmarks, and Substantive Representation

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