Earmarks and Subcommittee Government in the U.S. Congress

Abstract

In recent years, considerable scholarly attention has focused on earmarks, the quintessential example of pork barrel politics. We assess the degree to which existing theories can explain the distribution of earmarks in the U.S. House of Representatives. First, drawing on informal interviews with individuals on Capitol Hill regarding the earmark process, we argue that assessing institutional and constituency-level factors that affect the earmark receipts of individual members requires examination at the level of the Appropriations subcommittees. Second, we demonstrate that both distributive and partisan theories of legislative organization are applicable to the distribution of earmarks. Finally, we present results indicating that contrary to the conventional wisdom, most subcommittees do not distribute pork based on electoral vulnerability. Rather, legislators' status in the appropriations process has the most influence. These findings offer insights into the path forward as debate continues over congressionally directed spending.

Cardinals or Clerics? Congressional Committees and the Distribution of Pork

“…Balla et al () find that members of the Senate (but not House) Appropriations Committee deliver more academic earmarks than do non‐members. A spate of recent articles using the same data from Figure on earmark sponsorship in the 110th and 111th congresses find that members of the House and Senate Appropriations Committees receive more earmarks than non‐members (Clemens, Crespin, and Finocchiaro ; Lazarus , ; Lazarus and Steigerwalt ). Earmarking advantages have also been found for some but not all Senate Appropriations subcommittees (Crespin and Finocchiaro ) and for some authorizing committees in the House (Lazarus ).…”

The Political Geography of Distributive Politics

“…These areas are important centers of activity for the US military and defense contractors. Clemens, Crespin, and Finocchiaro () find that district demand plays a pronounced role in influencing earmark allocation for the Defense, Military Construction, and Agriculture subcommittees whereas demand is not significant for many of the other appropriations bills. Finally, the Appropriations Power Index variable is significant over the entire set of observations.…”

“…These models draw upon two dominant theories of congressional behavior: distributive theories that explain pork as a result of electorally motivated legislators (Ferejohn ; Mayhew ; Shepsle and Weingast ) and partisan theories that posit majority leaders who use pork, amongst other tools, to achieve party goals (Cox and McCubbins ). In this vein, scholars have found that leaders sometimes use earmarks to protect vulnerable incumbents (Engstrom and Vanberg ; Lazarus ) and have investigated whether demand for particular projects from the district is an important determinant of earmark awards (Clemens, Crespin, and Finocchiaro , ; Lazarus ). Moreover, it is now commonly accepted that legislators' standing in Congress—especially status as a member of the Appropriations Committee—is an important component of pork awards (Engstrom and Vanberg ; Lee ).…”

Knowledge, Expertise, and Committee Power in the Contemporary Congress

“…Yet, committees still appear to be influential forces. Congressional committees still have influence over policymaking (Adler and Wilkerson ; Woon and Anderson ), policy implementation (Ainsworth, Harward, and Moffett ; Shipan ), and the allocation of federal funds (Clemens, Crespin, and Finocchiaro ). Committees continue to be the target of lobbying efforts (Esterling ), and members continue to work hard to obtain ideal committee assignments (Frisch and Kelly ), find their assignments to be valuable (Grimmer and Powell ), and find their legislative lives structured by committee activity (Lipinski ).…”

“…Indeed, the very fact that the job of providing cues is delegated to committee leaders reflects their reputations as knowledgeable on the issues. As Curry () finds, rank‐and‐file lawmakers are far more trusting of information provided by committee leaders than party leaders.…”