Politicians and financial supervision unification outside the central bank: Why do they do it?

Masciandaro, Donato

doi:10.1016/j.jfs.2008.04.002

Cited by 64 publications

(42 citation statements)

References 10 publications

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“…Thus, not only does higher independence suggest more decentralised supervision as Melecky and Podpiera (2013) find, but also less involvement of central banks in the oversight of the financial sector. This is in line with the view that granting the unified supervisory power to an already highly independent central bank might increase the risk of bureaucratic misconduct (Masciandaro, 2009).…”

Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 86%

“…This puts the banking supervisory function of the central bank at the centre of our index. This differs from the index in Masciandaro (2006Masciandaro ( , 2009 which assigns a maximum of points whenever there is a unique supervisory authority regardless of whether this institution is the central bank. Moreover, the index proposed here brings a higher level of detail as compared to previous ones, by considering all possible levels of integration of financial sector supervision.…”

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Metrics And Stylised Factsmentioning

confidence: 98%

“…The different levels of integration assumed by this index are based on previous measures of financial sector supervision proposed in Masciandaro (2006Masciandaro ( , 2009 and Melecky and Podpiera (2013). We extend these indicators in several ways.…”

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Metrics And Stylised Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…As a result, the dummy variable for legislative reforms in CBI takes the value one only in years in which changes in the other characteristics of central bank institutional design took place. Furthermore, Masciandaro (2009) builds a political economy model to study the determinants of supervisory architectures and shows that the quality of public sector governance plays an important role. Based on these arguments one can expect that changes in the political orientation of the government might stimulate the implementation of reforms.…”

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Main Drivers Of Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Central bankers as supervisors: Do crises matter?

Masciandaro

Romelli

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

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Global Financial Crisis many countries have changed their financial supervisory architecture by increasing the involvement of central banks in supervision. This has led many scholars to argue that financial crises are an important driver in explaining the evolution of the role of central banks as supervisors. We formally test this hypothesis employing a new database that captures the full set of supervisory reforms implemented during the period 1996-2013 in a large sample of countries. Our findings support the view that systemic banking crises are important drivers of reforms in supervisory structure. However, we also highlight an equally important peer effect, namely a tendency of countries to reform their financial supervisory architecture when others do so as well. We construct several measures of spatial spillover effects and show that they can explain institutional similarities among countries and impact the probability of reforming the role of the central bank in financial sector supervision.

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Section: Introductionsupporting

confidence: 86%

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Metrics And Stylised Factsmentioning

confidence: 98%

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Metrics And Stylised Factsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Supervision and Central Banking: Main Drivers Of Reformsmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Central bankers as supervisors: Do crises matter?

Masciandaro

Romelli

2018

European Journal of Political Economy

Self Cite

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show abstract

“…Goodhart, 2000 andMaciandaro, 2008). Even without this, the national central banks and the European Central Bank (ECB) have a prominent role in the safeguarding of financial stability by ensuring price stability, and also by their provision of liquidity and oversight of payment systems.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%