Political strategy and climate policy: a rational choice perspective

Grundig, Frank

doi:10.1080/09644010903157057

Cited by 24 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 31 publications

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“…Second, other studies focus on TSOs’ motivations to select advocacy strategies or tactics. Two studies focus on how NGO tactics are affected by peers in advocacy networks (Hadden, 2018; Hadden & Jasny, 2019), while Grundig (2009) offers a rational choice model to explain promising strategies NGOs might employ to affect climate policy.…”

Section: Results Of Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Third Sector and Climate Change: A Literature Review and Agenda for Future Research and Action

Kagan

Dodge

2022

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

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This article presents a summary review of the voluntary sector literature on third sector organizations (TSOs) and climate change. As governments around the world fail to respond adequately to the climate crisis, TSOs are called upon to work with governments, advocate for policy change, and support communities. However, the literature on TSOs and climate change remains limited. We reviewed 68 articles about TSOs and climate change and identified four mechanisms for voluntary action on climate change, which vary on two dimensions—focusing on advocacy or implementation and occurring within or outside government—and include policy advocacy, advocacy for behavior change, participation in governance, and direct interventions. We conclude with five key areas for future research: explaining the relationship between advocacy strategies and context, foregrounding the role of TSOs in climate governance, exploring direct interventions by TSOs, examining community-based TSOs, and linking TSO action and climate outcomes.

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Section: Results Of Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Third Sector and Climate Change: A Literature Review and Agenda for Future Research and Action

Kagan

Dodge

2022

Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly

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“…A state's position depends on how ecologically vulnerable it is, how costly it is for it to address the problem given proposed arrangements under the regime (Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994), and side-effects on its economic competitiveness and ties with allies. States with low vulnerability and high abatement costs may be called ‘draggers’ or ‘laggards’, while states with high vulnerability and low costs and little or no other reason to oppose action are ‘pushers’ in the issue area (Grundig, 2009; Hovi et al , 2009; Sprinz and Vaahtoranta, 1994, p. 81). Second-order reasons for opposing progress may also arise.…”

Section: Group Leadership and Environmental Regime Effectivenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

Structural Group Leadership and Regime Effectiveness

Grundig

Ward

2013

Political Studies

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Usually the provision of international environmental public goods cannot be secured by a single state. Rather, a group of major powers has to pool its resources to provide structural leadership in order to achieve an effective regime. Such a group of pushers uses its structural power to achieve its goal. However, it faces two challenges. First, it may have to overcome the opposition of a group of laggards that desires less environmental protection and may try to counter the pushers' efforts. We hypothesise that the regime will be more effective to the extent to which the pushers predominate over the laggards in terms of structural power. Second, both groups may have to overcome a collective action problem with regard to dispensing costly side‐payments. We argue that social capital embedded in inter‐state networks may help the groups to overcome such collective action problems. Thus we argue that the regime will be more effective to the extent to which pushers are predominant and also have more social capital than laggards. Empirical results support our hypotheses.

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“…Political strategists propose 'pragmatic' solutions -governments must introduce unpopular policies early in their term of office, or negotiate away their right to decide on 'less important' policies (Compston 2008). Layfield (2008) and Grundig (2009) promote social movements that will influence government policy.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%