No abstract

The authors use network analysis to argue that the main contribution of intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) to international stability is not necessarily their direct and individual impact, because generally IGOs are institutionally weak. Rather, membership of IGOs creates network ties between states, allowing them, either individually or collectively, to intervene more effectively in latent conflicts. The IGO network also provides direct and indirect communication channels, where indirect links can act as partial substitutes for direct diplomatic ties. Empirically, the authors apply these ideas to the extensive network of international linkages created in the post—World War II period. They demonstrate that indirect links do indeed matter and that they substitute for more direct diplomatic ties. Furthermore, these effects are not limited to ties created by IGOs with specific security functions.

Do parties learn from or emulate parties in other political systems? This research develops the argument that parties are more likely to employ the heuristic of learning from and emulatingforeign successful (incumbent) parties. Spatial-econometric analyses of parties’ election policies from several established democracies robustly confirm that political parties respond to left-right policy positions of foreign political parties that have recently governed. By showing that parties respond to theseforeign incumbent parties, this work has significant implications for our understanding of party competition. Furthermore, we contribute to the literature on public policy diffusion, as we suggest that political parties are important vehiclesthroughwhich public policies diffuse.

Economists have made a strong case for the relative efficiency of market-based mechanisms for environmental regulation such as cap and trade and “green taxes,” yet the spread of these forms has been limited, and traditional “command and control” regulation still predominates. The authors explain geographical and temporal variation in green tax burdens by considering their domestic and international determinants, modeling international influences using spatial lags. Hypotheses are tested using panel data on Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development member states from 1995 to 2004. At the domestic level, the authors show that green tax burdens are influenced by the left–right and environmental positions of legislative medians and the power of the energy-producing sector, among other factors. The authors also show that ideas about policy diffuse through international networks generated by trade and environmental intergovernmental organizations, but they do not find compelling evidence for international tax competition.

Classical-liberal arguments about the pacifying effects of international trade are revisited, and it is argued that they consistently refer to the ability of trade to provide ‘connections’ between people and to create a perceived ‘global community’. Dependency and openness are commonly used to test for any pacifying effects of trade in the current literature, but these measures fail to capture some of the classical liberals’ key insights. Several network measures are introduced in order to give natural expression to and to develop the classical-liberal view that trade linkages reduce interstate conflict. These measures applied to trade flows are incorporated in the Russett & Oneal triangulating-peace model. The main results are that trade networks are indeed pacifying in that both direct and indirect trade linkages matter, and as the global trade network has become more dense over time, the importance of indirect links by way of specific third countries has declined, and the general embeddedness of state dyads in the trade network has become more relevant. These findings suggest that the period since World War II has seen progressive realization of the classical-liberal ideal of a security community of trading states.