Political Representation by Ethnic Parties? Electoral Performance and Party-Building Processes among Ethnic Parties in Myanmar

Abstract

What is the role of political representation by ethnic parties in a multi-ethnic state that has undergone a transition from military rule, and is seeking to resolve protracted intrastate conflicts? The present article examines this question through a contextual case study of ethnic parties in Myanmar – a state that is characterised by unresolved ethnic grievances and conflicts; a political transition that has created new opportunities for ethnic representation; and multiple ethnic parties making representative claims on behalf of ethnic groups. Based on a mixed methods approach, the article documents that ethnic parties have been relatively ineffective in ensuring formal and descriptive representation and have had limited possibilities for substantive representation of ethnic interests. The article also identifies key explanations for the weak electoral performance of ethnic parties, emphasising party fragmentation and vote-splitting as well as weak party institutionalisation and limited capacity to make representative claims. Finally, the article analyses strategies for party-building, in preparation for the 2020 election. Based on the common emphasis on vote-splitting, most ethnic states have seen initiatives to merge parties, while a few parties have also sought to develop their political platform and sector policies. The article concludes that ethnic parties may gain improved formal representation after the next election but questions about the parties’ capacity for substantive representation remains. The 2020 election will thus be a new test for how ethnic voters see themselves best represented, in the light of competing representative claims and past experiences: by ethnic parties or non-ethnic democracy parties?

Myanmar's 2020 Election: Explaining the Strong Performance of the NLD and Some Ethnic Parties

“…Small ethnic parties became victims of strategic voting when ethnic voters supported the NLD which also nominated ethnic candidates in state constituencies. Additionally, these local ethnic parties lacked distinct programs to attract voters; party institutionalization was weak among most of them (Stokke 2019). The presence of so many ethnic parties also resulted in a split in the votes of those inclined to cast ballots based on ethnicity (Tan and Preece 2020).…”

“…The NLD's 2015 victory had been attributed to Aung San Suu Kyi's popularity and to the belief that she would bring much-needed economic and political changes to the country (Thawnghmung 2016). Ethnic parties, on the other hand, suffered from vote-splitting, weak party institutionalization, and disadvantage in the first-past-the-post electoral system (Aung 2018; Stokke 2019; Tan and Preece 2020). However, in the NLD government's first term, the country suffered from weak economic performance, stalled political reforms, and delayed peace talks (Callahan 2018).…”

Ruling but not Governing: Tutelary Regimes and the Case of Myanmar

“…This illustrates that there is a certain democratic choice in Myanmar, unlike the case in competitive authoritarian states where elections do not pose a serious threat to the incumbents, and institutions ‘are a façade in order to conceal and reproduce harsh realities of authoritarian governance’ (Schedler 2006: 1). The military has not manipulated elections or interfered in the formation of the government, either during the 2015 elections or in the numerous by-elections in 2012, 2017 or 2018, all of which were won by the oppositional NLD or ethnic parties (Stokke 2019). In 2020, the military also did not respond – either before or after the election – to the lobbying of opposition parties calling for it to step in.…”

“…Furthermore, the military has used its parliamentary representation to keep elected politicians in check. By establishing the USDP, a ‘military proxy party’ (Stokke 2019), the military was able to dominate the early years of political liberalization under President U Thein Sein (2011–15), thus putting Myanmar on the path towards a ‘discipline-flourishing democracy’. Political freedoms were expanded, but only as long as they did not contravene existing security laws, which meant clear limits to freedom of association, movement and the press.…”

“…However, in other tutelary regimes, in which other political actors loom large over the political system (such as the religious authorities in Iran), the effects might be different. Second, Myanmar's tutelary regime is facing other daunting challenges, such as the dominant position of the executive, constrained citizenship, a lack of substantive representation of political parties and an authoritarian political culture, all of which are impinging on democratic diversity and pluralism (Chu et al 2016;David and Holliday 2018;Holliday 2014;Stokke 2019). While this has been acknowledged elsewhere, the analysis here aims to understand the functioning of tutelary regimes and to show how the involvement of Myanmar's military in politics is designed to systematically limit substantial democracy.…”