2008
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.970550
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Political Influence and Declarations of Bank Insolvency in Japan

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Cited by 20 publications
(20 citation statements)
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“…This is because investors and entrepreneurs will be less willing to commit to productive activities when they know they might be putting their entire personal fortunes in jeopardy (Cirmizi et al 2011). For example, if it was not for the effective and robust insolvency resolving framework in Japan, then some of their struggling banks would not have been reorganised or absorbed by the stronger banks (Imai, 2009;Hoshi, 2002). Third, a weak resolving insolvency framework increases the cost of capital and is not able to mitigate against the weak mechanisms that are often responsible for business failures.…”
Section: Dependent Variablementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This is because investors and entrepreneurs will be less willing to commit to productive activities when they know they might be putting their entire personal fortunes in jeopardy (Cirmizi et al 2011). For example, if it was not for the effective and robust insolvency resolving framework in Japan, then some of their struggling banks would not have been reorganised or absorbed by the stronger banks (Imai, 2009;Hoshi, 2002). Third, a weak resolving insolvency framework increases the cost of capital and is not able to mitigate against the weak mechanisms that are often responsible for business failures.…”
Section: Dependent Variablementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Also in the United States,Liu and Ngo (2014) show that political concerns play a significant role in the timing of bank failures over the period 1976-2010 Brown and Dinc (2005). find consistent evidence from a sample of large banks in 21 emerging countries, whileImai (2009) examines the case of Japan in 1999-2002. Our paper adopts a different perspective and provides evidence of special interest politics being at play in the resolution of failed banks.©International Monetary Fund.…”
mentioning
confidence: 79%
“…Compared to the results of Table 2, the inefficiency of banks with politically connected leadership (POL) is more pronounced. This significance might be due to regulatory forbearance granted to politically connected banks by regulatory agencies or to the pursuit of private benefits and perks by politically connected bankers (Imai 2009). …”
Section: Additional Analysesmentioning
confidence: 99%