Political Dynasties

Bó, Ernesto Dal; Bó, Pedro Dal; Snyder, Jason A.

doi:10.2139/ssrn.909251

Cited by 23 publications

(35 citation statements)

References 24 publications

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“…Still, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure. A brief survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to past parliaments range from as low as 6 percent in the United States (Dal Bo et al 2009) There is a view that the prevalence of political dynasties signals the deterioration of political equality and the resulting political monopoly leads to a deterioration of socioeconomic outcomes that prevent people from effectively communicating their needs to their government. Moreover, dynastic officials can use the powers of the state for self-serving interests without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions.…”

Section: Abstract: Democracy; Political Dynasty; Philippine Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Still, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure. A brief survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to past parliaments range from as low as 6 percent in the United States (Dal Bo et al 2009) or 10 percent in Argentina (Rossi 2009) to as high as 37 to 40 percent in Japan and Mexico (Asako et al 2010). In the case of the Philippines, the share of political dynasties is estimated between 50 percent (Querubin 2010a) and 70 percent (calculations of the authors) if the links to the local government units are included in the count.…”

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confidence: 99%

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Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress

Mendoza

Beja

Venida

et al. 2012

Philippine Political Science Journal

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This paper presents metrics to estimate the size of political dynasties in the 15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines and analyze the relationship between political dynasty and socio-economic outcomes.Results show that political dynasties comprise 70 percent of jurisdiction-based legislators in the current Congress. They possess higher net worth and win elections by larger margins of victory compared to not political dynasties. Jurisdictions of political dynasties are characterized by lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality. Keywords: democracy; political dynasty; Philippine CongressDemocracies are widely touted to be able to facilitate and sustain broader and more inclusive processes of economic and human development. Scholars associate political democracy with more predictable long-run economic growth, enhanced macroeconomic stability, more rational management of economic and political shocks and crises, and improved distributional outcomes.In theory, democracies guarantee equal voice in government decision-making through a range of mechanisms like one-person-one-vote, equality in political participation, and free speech. A democracy has the potential to cultivate an environment that is responsive to the needs of its citizens that, often, brings about higher levels of human capital investments and more inclusive  Corresponding author. E-mail: RUMENDOZA@AIM.EDU 2 and equitable social and economic outcomes. However, underdeveloped democratic institutions could be associated with weak political participation and thus produce, in some cases, political dynasties. Still, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure. A brief survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to past parliaments range from as low as 6 percent in the United States (Dal Bo et al. 2009) There is a view that the prevalence of political dynasties signals the deterioration of political equality and the resulting political monopoly leads to a deterioration of socioeconomic outcomes that prevent people from effectively communicating their needs to their government. Moreover, dynastic officials can use the powers of the state for self-serving interests without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions. They also skew the selection of political leaders, thereby favoring those with influence, possibly preventing the best and the brightest from serving in the government, and/or biasing policies in favor of certain groups. Yet, an alternative view suggests that political dynasties afford reformists an extended time horizons that enable more effective planning and implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with shorter tenures often yield to populist demands and shun difficult but necessary reforms that pay-off in the future, and are critical to sustained, robust, and inclusive growth. It is also possible that dynastic politicians possess legacy-related motivations that are strongly l...

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Section: Abstract: Democracy; Political Dynasty; Philippine Congressmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Still, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure. A brief survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to past parliaments range from as low as 6 percent in the United States (Dal Bo et al 2009) or 10 percent in Argentina (Rossi 2009) to as high as 37 to 40 percent in Japan and Mexico (Asako et al 2010). In the case of the Philippines, the share of political dynasties is estimated between 50 percent (Querubin 2010a) and 70 percent (calculations of the authors) if the links to the local government units are included in the count.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress

Mendoza

Beja

Venida

et al. 2012

Philippine Political Science Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

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“…Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder (2009) find that, in the case of elected office, there is a strong causal relationship between parental electoral wins and their offspring later holding office, which they attribute to self-perpetuating political power. Hellerstein and Morill (2011) compare, as women became more likely to work, trends in the likelihood that daughters assume their father's occupation with trends in the likelihood that they assume their fatherin-law's and estimate that at least 13% of the increase in the former was driven by occupation-specific human capital transmission.…”

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confidence: 98%

“…As professions typically are not randomly assigned, the existing support for a causal relationship is limited (Dal Bó, Dal Bó, and Snyder, 2009;Hellerstein and Morill, 2011;Campante and Yanagizawa-Drott, 2015).…”

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confidence: 99%

Un-Fortunate Sons: Effects of the Vietnam Draft Lottery on the Next Generation's Labor Market

Goodman

Isen

2017

FEDS

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A b s t r a c tCan shocks to one generation propagate to the next? To answer this question, we study how the Vietnam draft lottery affected the next generation's labor market. Using the universe of U.S. federal tax returns, we link fathers from draft cohorts to their sons' outcomes and find that sons of fathers randomly called by the draft 1) have lower earnings and labor force participation than their peers, and 2) are more likely to volunteer for military service. These findings highlight the strong role family plays in human capital development and occupational choice. More generally, our results provide sound evidence that malleable aspects of a parent's life course can influence children's labor market outcomes and that policies that only directly alter the circumstances of one generation can have important long-run effects on the next.

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“…Dal Bo et al (2009) 4 Previously, Argentine Senators had nine-year terms. The Argentine Constitution required the renewal of a third of the chamber every three years.…”

Section: Self-perpetuationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Dynasties and Poverty: Resolving the 'Chicken or the Egg' Question

Mendoza,

Beja,

Venida

et al. 2013

SSRN Journal

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Abstract"Political dynasty" refers to the situation wherein members of the same family are occupying elected positions either in sequence for the same position, or simultaneously across different positions. In the Philippines, political dynasties are prevalent in areas with more severe poverty.Two explanations for this situation have been proposed: poverty brings about political dynasties, or political dynasties engender poverty. These arguments suggest that the relationship between political dynasties and poverty can be treated as an empirical question. (So which one is the chicken, and which one is the egg?) In order to examine the direction of causality between political dynasties and poverty, this paper turns to provincial-level data from the Philippines and develops novel metrics on political dynasties: the shares of total positions occupied by dynastic politicians, of the largest dynastic clan as regards total positions, and of dynastic concentration inspired by the industrial concentration literature. To address endogeneity, instrumental variables for poverty are used, consisting of indicators for rainfall and the geographical distance to Manila (the Capital). The results we find are striking: poverty entrenches political dynasties; education appears to have no bearing on political dynasties; and the media affect only the largest political dynasties. There is less evidence that political dynasties bring about poverty.

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Political Dynasties

Cited by 23 publications

References 24 publications

Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress

Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress

Un-Fortunate Sons: Effects of the Vietnam Draft Lottery on the Next Generation's Labor Market

Political Dynasties and Poverty: Resolving the 'Chicken or the Egg' Question

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