Inequality in democracy: Insights from an empirical analysis of political dynasties in the 15th Philippine Congress

Abstract

This paper presents metrics to estimate the size of political dynasties in the 15th Congress of the Republic of the Philippines and analyze the relationship between political dynasty and socio-economic outcomes.Results show that political dynasties comprise 70 percent of jurisdiction-based legislators in the current Congress. They possess higher net worth and win elections by larger margins of victory compared to not political dynasties. Jurisdictions of political dynasties are characterized by lower standards of living, lower human development, and higher levels of deprivation and inequality. Keywords: democracy; political dynasty; Philippine CongressDemocracies are widely touted to be able to facilitate and sustain broader and more inclusive processes of economic and human development. Scholars associate political democracy with more predictable long-run economic growth, enhanced macroeconomic stability, more rational management of economic and political shocks and crises, and improved distributional outcomes.In theory, democracies guarantee equal voice in government decision-making through a range of mechanisms like one-person-one-vote, equality in political participation, and free speech. A democracy has the potential to cultivate an environment that is responsive to the needs of its citizens that, often, brings about higher levels of human capital investments and more inclusive  Corresponding author. E-mail: RUMENDOZA@AIM.EDU 2 and equitable social and economic outcomes. However, underdeveloped democratic institutions could be associated with weak political participation and thus produce, in some cases, political dynasties. Still, political dynasties can exist in any democracy regardless of its structure. A brief survey of the literature suggests that the share of legislators with dynastic links to past parliaments range from as low as 6 percent in the United States (Dal Bo et al. 2009) There is a view that the prevalence of political dynasties signals the deterioration of political equality and the resulting political monopoly leads to a deterioration of socioeconomic outcomes that prevent people from effectively communicating their needs to their government. Moreover, dynastic officials can use the powers of the state for self-serving interests without fear of replacement or administrative sanctions. They also skew the selection of political leaders, thereby favoring those with influence, possibly preventing the best and the brightest from serving in the government, and/or biasing policies in favor of certain groups. Yet, an alternative view suggests that political dynasties afford reformists an extended time horizons that enable more effective planning and implementation of policies with long-term goals. Politicians with shorter tenures often yield to populist demands and shun difficult but necessary reforms that pay-off in the future, and are critical to sustained, robust, and inclusive growth. It is also possible that dynastic politicians possess legacy-related motivations that are strongly l...

Political Dynasties and Poverty: Resolving the 'Chicken or the Egg' Question

“…Dal Bo et al 2009). Furthermore, Mendoza, et al (2012) found evidence that political dynasties in the 15th Congress won by much larger margins of victory, and tended to be wealthier. Nevertheless, they found that Philippine provinces with higher levels of political dynasties also displayed higher levels of poverty and weaker indicators of human development.…”

“…His analysis of the disbursement of the constituent development fund (CDF) of legislators tends to favor local patrons, particularly mayoral partisan allies in their districts. Such a skewed allocation of resources could also potentially weaken the chances to attain policy objectives such as poverty reduction, as argued by Mendoza, et al (2012). Hence, self-perpetuation and (less robust) poverty reduction outcomes may actually be linked, even as it appears that political patrons are trying to spend public funds in a "pro-poor" way.…”

“…This view posits that decreased political competition arises because political dynasties, in turn reflecting a tendency for weaker accountability. On the other hand, political dynasties might also possess a long runway for reform, as well as legacy motivations, in turn suggesting a negative relationship with povertythat is, due to their long runway for policy reforms, political dynasties could be more successful in reducing poverty (e.g., Mendoza et al 2012). …”

“…province). See, for example, Balisacan andFuwa (2004), Querrubin (2010;2011) and Mendoza et al (2012) that look at political dynasties in the country at the aggregate level.…”

Tried and Tested? Dynastic Persistence and Legislative Productivity at the Philippine House of Representatives

“…The role that elites and well‐entrenched families play in politics, no doubt, has long captured the interest of scholars of Philippine politics who sought to explain whether the persistence of political dynasties has contributed to lagging economic outcomes and democratic capture (Mendoza, Beja, Venida, & Yap, ; Rivera, ). Mendoza, Beja, Venida, and Yap () believe there is strong evidence that political dynasties proliferate in the most economically depressed provinces but admit that political dynasties may not necessarily be inducing poverty.…”