Political devolution and employment relations in Great Britain: the case of the Living Wage

Abstract

This article examines the role of the devolved governments of Scotland and Wales in promoting the voluntary Living Wage. It shows that active promotion of the Living Wage standard has emerged in both countries from a broader commitment to an economic policy of ‘inclusive growth’. Employment law is not a devolved matter, and the article identifies a broad range of economic incentives and soft forms of regulation that have been used by the devolved governments to promote the Living Wage in the absence of hard power to legislate. Non‐legislative forms of state intervention are often regarded sceptically, but the article shows that the attempts of devolved governments to spread the Living Wage have been impactful, particularly in Scotland.

The influence of ‘soft’ fair work regulation on union recovery: A case of re‐recognition in the Scottish voluntary social care sector

“…As previously mentioned, compliance through hard regulation links to its capacity to impose standards and penalties (Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006). Soft regulation brings multiple forms of enabling compliance (not all successful) including benchmarking and persuasion, financial and competitive incentives, multiple monitoring and enforcement measures, reducing conflict through offering flexibility and leeway to employers to meet labour standards and a range of different influencers/actors (e.g., government, NGOs, quasi‐independent government bodies, intermediaries and international bodies) (Heery et al, 2020; Jacobsson, 2004; Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006; Marchington, 2015; Sabel et al, 2000; Sisson, 2019). Government remains a key authority and enabler among these actors.…”

“…Soft regulations are measures that are not enshrined in law and can only persuade rather than compel employers to implement specific practices (Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006). Research into soft regulation is topical, as seen in a wide variety of studies exploring the cross‐border employment regulation of multinational corporations (Hepple, 2005; Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006; Szabados, 2021), and more recent attention devoted to the measures adopted by the devolved governments in the United Kingdom to promote fair work (FW) (Heery et al, 2020; Sisson, 2019). Devolved governments in Scotland and Wales have designed FW to help build ‘inclusive growth’, instead of low wage, poor quality jobs.…”

“…Devolved governments in Scotland and Wales have designed FW to help build ‘inclusive growth’, instead of low wage, poor quality jobs. Soft regulation is chosen to achieve these goals because employment law remains one of the UK government's reserved powers, so the devolved governments cannot legislate through hard law (Heery et al, 2020; Sisson, 2019).…”

“…For some, these initiatives promoting FW are seen as promising alternative social democratic forms of employment relations in at least parts of the United Kingdom (Heery et al, 2020; Sisson, 2019). Not all, however, are as optimistic.…”

“…The first is that ‘soft regulation’ provides low to zero impact due to lack of legal standing/enforceability (Meardi, 2012; Stuart et al, 2011). The second sees soft regulation having a positive impact on its own because it can bring a range of alternative measures for compliance where hard regulation fails, for example, through raising public awareness and opinion, sanctions against products and the role of powerful soft intermediary bodies that influence organisations, such as professional associations, employers organisations and unions (Heery et al, 2020; Kuruvilla & Verma, 2006; Marchington, 2015; Sabel et al, 2000; Sisson, 2019). The third sees soft regulation offering a positive impact due to its supplementation of ‘hard law’, that is, they are not mutually exclusive, as the former can fill the gaps that the latter does not reach (Locke et al, 2013; Szabados, 2021).…”