Political Cycles, Political Institutions and Public Expenditure in India, 1980–2000

Abstract

In Western democracies it is held that parties and their positions affect how politicians choose to make public expenditure and investment. This article examines the public policy choices of politicians in India, a large well-established democracy with remarkable subnational variation. Public expenditure, from education and health to agriculture and irrigation, is analysed. Counterintuitive findings – that election timing and political factors play a strong role in the subnational states, and that party competition increases investment in education – are explained by highlighting the role economic and political uncertainty plays in politicians’ choices. Building a ‘Polanyi’ argument enhanced by a supply-side mechanism highlights the importance of compensation and insurance and the imperatives of political stability for subnational politicians, who attempt to maximize re-election chances in an uncertain environment.

Democracy and infant mortality within India: from whether to why

“…The data for infant mortality are available from the Sample Registration Systems (various years) surveys published yearly by the Office of the Registrar General. 28 Consistent with existing studies (Chhibber and Nooruddin, 2004;Sáez and Sinha, 2009, among several others), this paper also primarily focuses on the major Indian states. Political representation is measured with the effective number of parliamentary parties, which takes into account each party's seat-share in the 'Vidhan Sabha' (lower house of the state legislature).…”

“…6 Thus, understanding the subnational variation in infant mortality at the state level is imperative. 7 This is especially relevant in light of the fact that state governments are primarily responsible for providing welfare goods and services in a federal system such as India (Sáez and Sinha, 2009). Despite differences among Indian states, a subnational study provides a better control for measurable and 4 I use the 'polity2' variable from the Polity IV data set to differentiate between democracies and nondemocracies (Marshall and Jaggers, 2012).…”

States as laboratories: The politics of social welfare policies in India

“…Whereas Chhibber and Nooruddin find that two-party systems at the state level provide more public goods because politicians must cultivate a wider public appeal, 27 Saez and Sinha find that more fragmented party systems see higher levels of expenditure on public goods because of the greater degree of political uncertainty in such states. 28 A partial explanation for this contradiction might hinge on levels of turnout: Nooruddin and Simmons find that in more fragmented party systems where turnout is higher, the size of the winning coalition is larger and politicians will spend more on public goods. 29 Yet overall this literature is too sparse and contradictory to offer clear conclusions on how politics affects social policy.…”

India's urban constituencies revisited

“…Scholars have found evidence that the nature and extent of electoral competition in India influence levels of public spending (Chhibber and Nooruddin 2004;Khemani 2004;Saez and Sinha 2010). Saez and Sinha (2010), for instance, find a positive association between electoral competition and public goods provision across India's states, as incumbents in competitive environments have incentives to 'overbid' on their public expenditures to capture every possible vote (Saez and Sinha 2010).…”

“…Saez and Sinha (2010), for instance, find a positive association between electoral competition and public goods provision across India's states, as incumbents in competitive environments have incentives to 'overbid' on their public expenditures to capture every possible vote (Saez and Sinha 2010). How, then, might differences in turnout and electoral competition influence distributive politics between cities and the countryside?…”