2010
DOI: 10.1007/s11366-010-9112-4
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Political Compromises: The Privatization of Small- and Medium-Sized Public Enterprises in China

Abstract: One important feature of China's privatization process is that insider privatization prevailed, and that outsiders could hardly gain access to buying state enterprises. Why was a majority of small-and medium-sized public enterprises sold to the firms' former managers (and workers)? How did the tightened regulatory environment affect local privatization in China? Building on insights into institutional change, I argue that the choice of a specific privatization strategy results from political compromises among … Show more

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…This occurred in parallel with the approval of private property rights. At the local government level, meanwhile, bargaining between officials and firm managers had the greatest impact on resulting shareholding distributions (Dong et al , 2002a, b; Zeng, 2010; Sun et al , 2010). The broader employee group was only entitled to the shares not initially allocated to the preferred parties of management and a few key employees.…”
Section: Employee Ownership During Chinese Privatisation: a Review Of The Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…This occurred in parallel with the approval of private property rights. At the local government level, meanwhile, bargaining between officials and firm managers had the greatest impact on resulting shareholding distributions (Dong et al , 2002a, b; Zeng, 2010; Sun et al , 2010). The broader employee group was only entitled to the shares not initially allocated to the preferred parties of management and a few key employees.…”
Section: Employee Ownership During Chinese Privatisation: a Review Of The Evidencementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Many opportunities and privileges were extended to other middle- and high-ranking enterprise cadres as well. Enterprise restructuring since the 1990s witnessed a rapid transfer of state assets into the hands of the managerial nomenclature and private individuals, often in a covert way (Ding, 2000; Hurst, 2015; Zeng, 2010).…”
Section: Pension Protests Versus Non-pension Protestsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…But that does not mean that local officials can completely ignore workers' grievances and discontents, nor does that mean the Chinese central government has lost control over localities. Studies have found that the CCP is still capable in monitoring local officials through the cadre evaluation and promotion system (See, e.g., Landry 2008, Zeng 2007. Under the Hu-Wen administration, local officials are given environmental and other social targets (e.g., the numbers of mass incidents) besides GDP in the cadre evaluation system in the effort to create a "harmonious society" (Wang 2008).…”
Section: Support Us Employers and Civil Society Initiativesmentioning
confidence: 99%