Political Action and Resentful Affectivity in Critical Times

Abstract

How does the study of emotions help us understand engaging in or abstaining from violent and illegal political behaviors in the context of the Eurozone economic crisis? This question sits at the core of our article. We focus particularly on anger, fear, and hope hypothesizing that combined with perceptions of self-efficacy, these emotions fuse in complex affective blends of resentful or ressentiment-ful affectivity, which in turn determine the path of citizens’ political engagement. We test this using data from a three-wave cross-sectional survey from Greece, which contains measures of emotions and unique items of engagement with illegal and violent political actions. We show that such behaviors rest on complex clusters of resentful affectivity pointing to particular actions and reactions. Our theoretical and empirical framework can be useful for understanding political developments outside Greece manifested as grievances, anti-immigration demands, anti-establishment sentiment, anti-expert skepticism, and support for populist parties, extending previous theoretical and empirical work, which currently employ discrete measures of emotions.

Reactionary Politics: Explaining the Psychological Roots of Anti Preferences in European Integration and Immigration Debates

“…The reactionary orientation draws on conservation values and an aversion to what is new. Its affective undertone is the complex emotions of resentment and ressentiment, blending anger, fear, nostalgic hope, betrayal, and a sense of perceived injustice (Capelos & Demertzis, ; Lilla, ). Evidence of reactionism is empirically traced in engagement and dormant support of illegal and violent political actions, powered by a deepening sense of economic stagnation, anxiety brought about by the financial crisis, and economic and cultural fears of many citizens.…”

“…Moreover, the reactionary orientation is not a personality trait, and thus it does not define individuals during their lifetime. Rather it is a self‐ascribed way of relating to the political world: For some citizens, it is a meaningful orientation, for others less so (Capelos & Demertzis, ). Over time, it is strengthened, moderated, and superseded based on how citizens interact with their political environment.…”

Affective economy of national-populist images: Investigating national and transnational online networks through visual big data

“…comments and reactions) that make them more visible on Facebook, the images have gained affective force. As previous studies suggested (Capelos and Demertzis, 2018;Salmela and Scheve, 2017;, emotions such as anger, fear and resentment among supporters are essential for the success of national-populist movements. Our study shows that Facebook is an effective tool to spreading such images that mobilize such emotions both nationally and transnationally.…”

Dealing with Undeniable Differences in Thessaloniki’s Solidarity Economy of Food

“…Based on 24 months of ethnographic fieldwork in Thessaloniki, this article challenges the common allegory of a fundamental cultural (or even ethnic) ineptitude to collaborate, indicated by the reference to collaboration "not being in our DNA" as expressed by Angelos in the above excerpt. Using ideas from Iris Young's [14] The Ideal of Community and the Politics of Difference, I develop the argument that structurally rooted conflicts are amplified by the capitalist crisis [13]. Additionally, I argue that the romanticisation of solidarity, in the internal and external promotion of economic alternatives, alongside the lack of a political sensibility to recognise and mediate structural difference, allows for the glossing over of differences that are the cause of tension and divisions.…”

“…Moreover, the anger of some Greek people at dissenting responses to draconian austerity measures is discussed as a possible attempt to evade their own responsibility and make sense of socioeconomic transformations perceived to be out of their control [11], facilitating the neoliberal myth of individualised responsibility for economic success or failure. This stereotype of Greek people has also been used to justify the structural adjustments forced on the Greek people by the Troika [12,13].…”