Policymaking under Cohabitation

Lazardeux, Sébastien G.

doi:10.1057/9781137476906_2

Cited by 2 publications

(4 citation statements)

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“…Other studies have observed intra-executive conflict in consolidated democracies (e.g. Lazardeux 2015; Raunio 2012) as well as in new democracies and transitional states (e.g. Beuman 2016; Sedelius and Ekman 2010).…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: Institutions and (Dis)incentives For mentioning

confidence: 97%

“…Under cohabitation the president and the PM are ideologically often quite far apart, and even when there is intra-executive coordination, presidents can in the end choose to exercise their right of veto over legislation or appointments or publicly criticize the government’s policies while prime ministers may try to push through legislation they know will not please the president. For example, Sébastien Lazardeux (2015) shows how electoral motives, particularly winning presidential elections, the main prize in French politics, have shaped the strategies of both executives. However, the impact of such confrontational behaviour on overall intra-executive relations is surely mitigated by regular coordination.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: Institutions and (Dis)incentives For mentioning

confidence: 99%

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Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Raunio¹,

Sedelius²

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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Despite more than two decades of research on semi-presidential regimes, we still know very little about the actual coordination between the president and the prime minister. Through an in-depth analysis of Lithuanian semi-presidentialism, this article underscores the importance of institutional design on intra-executive balance of power. Drawing primarily on interviews with top-level civil servants and office-holders, it argues that in the absence of written rules or other strong norms guiding intra-executive coordination, presidents enjoy more discretion in designing their own modes of operation. Coordination depends on the initiative of the president, with ad hoc practices further weakening the position of the prime minister. While Lithuanian semi-presidentialism has functioned smoothly, the personality-centred politics commonly found in Central and East European countries create favourable conditions for presidential activism.

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Section: Theoretical Framework: Institutions and (Dis)incentives For mentioning

confidence: 97%

Section: Theoretical Framework: Institutions and (Dis)incentives For mentioning

confidence: 99%

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Raunio¹,

Sedelius²

2017

Gov. & oppos.

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“…Indeed, there may be good reasons for politicians motivated by re-election or policy influence not to enter into cooperation or, despite coordination mechanisms, to ‘go public’ with their opinion differences, especially when the two leaders represent different ideological blocs (cohabitation). For example, Lazardeux (2015) shows that in France winning presidential elections, the main prize in French politics, has shaped the strategies of both executives despite active intra-executive coordination.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework: (Dis)incentives For Cooperation and Cmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Beuman, 2016; Elgie, 2018; Protsyk, 2005, 2006). Intra-executive conflict is associated with negative outcomes such as cabinet instability (Sedelius and Ekman, 2010) and disruptive policy making (Lazardeux, 2015, 2017). A largely neglected variable in the comparative literature, however, is the institutional instruments for coordinating policy and executive leadership between the president and the cabinet.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Presidents and Cabinets: Coordinating Executive Leadership in Premier-Presidential Regimes

Raunio

Sedelius

2019

Political Studies Review

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A key factor of semi-presidential regimes is power-sharing mechanisms between president and government. Influenced by Shugart and Carey’s seminal work on premier-presidential regimes, this article addresses intra-executive dynamics in light of recent scholarship on the risks and consequences associated with conflict and cooperation between the president and the cabinet. Through an in-depth comparison of three premier-presidential systems with broadly similar constitutional designs, Finland, Lithuania and Romania, it forces us to reconsider how coordination mechanisms and political context shape presidential influence. Absent of a working constitutional division of labour and established modes of intra-executive coordination, presidents are more likely to use alternative channels of influence – such as the strategy of ‘going public’ or direct contacts with political parties, the legislature or civil society stakeholders – and to intervene in questions falling under the competence of the government. Lack of institutionalized coordination also benefits the presidents as they hold the initiative regarding cooperation between the two executives.

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Policymaking under Cohabitation

Cited by 2 publications

References 0 publications

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Shifting Power-Centres of Semi-Presidentialism: Exploring Executive Coordination in Lithuania

Presidents and Cabinets: Coordinating Executive Leadership in Premier-Presidential Regimes

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