Polarization, Partisan Preferences and Strategic Voting

Abstract

In this article, we study how polarization affects the propensity of supporters of non-viable parties to cast a strategic vote. To do so, we rely on Canadian election panel surveys from the Making Electoral Democracy Work project that were specifically designed to identify strategic voting. We find that the polarization between viable parties increases the probability of a supporter of a non-viable party casting a strategic vote, because it increases how much she likes her favourite viable party, and decreases how much she dislikes her least favourite viable party. Polarization thus increases strategic voting because it alters partisan preferences.

The “Tipping Point” of a Strategic Vote: When Does an Individual Vote Strategically?

“…Two of these three predictors (preferred party's rating and favourite viable party's rating) are statistically significant in every election for both countries, while the other (preferred party's distance from contention) is significant in five of six election datasets. These statistical similarities demonstrate how comparable the main triggers and motivations are for strategic voting between the two countries' electorates and confirm findings from other research in the domain (for example, Niemi et al, 1992;Blais et al, 2009;Daoust and Bol, 2018).…”

“…The three variables that are clearly correlated across both countries and have a high impact on strategic voting are the preferred party's distance from contention, the rating given to the preferred party and the favourite viable party rating. All three variables have proven to be statistically significant in other studies as well (Blais et al, 2001(Blais et al, , 2009Daoust and Bol, 2018). For clarity in my analysis, I have termed these the influential predictors.…”

“…With a focus on the FPTP system, I define strategic voters in this article as individuals who support a party that is non-viable (outside of the top two contending parties 2 ) and vote for their favourite of the perceived two viable parties, rather than their highest preferred party (Daoust and Bol, 2018). Using this definition, I build on the current strategic voting literature by measuring variables that define why individuals vote strategically (for example: chances of winning, party and leader preferences) and using this information to empirically estimate the "tipping point" for when a supporter of a non-viable party might switch a vote from a preferred party (a sincere vote) to a secondary option (a strategic vote).…”

Why Bother? Supporters of Locally Weaker Parties Are Less Likely to Vote or to Vote Sincerely

“…Using this definition, we find strategic voting by 7.1 per cent of post-election respondents (who voted and who ranked the parties' chances of winning the local seat). This is above the level detected in many studies of plurality elections, particularly in Canada, where estimates have ranged from 2 per cent to 5 per cent (Blais, 2002;Blais et al, 2009;Blais and Gschwend, 2010;Blais, 2004;Blais et al, 2001;Daoust and Bol, 2020;Merolla and Stephenson, 2007). However, those estimates mostly pre-date the emergence of a competitive Green Party.…”

“…So we generally use the straightforward vote intention questions, but we also construct a measure of voters' preferred party (PP) so we can include the "certain not to vote" respondents in some analyses. The PP measure is also key to our determination of who has voted strategically, as in other studies of strategic voting (Daoust and Bol, 2020). We infer voters' PP based on their responses to the party and leader feeling thermometers; 78 per cent of respondents gave consistent responses in that their preferred leader was from the same party as their preferred party.…”