Polarising Pluralism: The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2014

Aylott, Nicholas; Bolin, Niklas

doi:10.1080/01402382.2014.1000651

Cited by 36 publications

(20 citation statements)

References 13 publications

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“…The Swedish case is an extreme and illustrative example: in 2014, parliamentary majority was won by a coalition of right‐of‐centre parties, but the incumbent centre‐right prime minister, Fredrik Reinfeldt, refused to collaborate with the PRW party (the Swedish Democrats). With the Swedish Democrats out of the equation, the left‐wing coalition commanded a majority and the Social Democrats took office (Aylott & Bolin ). Given the above constraints, our first hypothesis is that, even if PRW parties are electorally strong, hold a favourable bargaining position in parliament and have welfare chauvinistic preferences figuring prominently on their campaign agenda, direct welfare chauvinism at the social policy level is not likely to occur ( H1 ).…”

Section: The Policy Effects Of Populist Right‐wing Partiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party

et al. 2016

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This article develops a theoretical distinction between direct and indirect welfare chauvinism in order to analyze how electorally successful populist right‐wing parties transmit social policy preferences with significant redistributive implications for the shape of the welfare state. Direct welfare chauvinism occurs as a result of legislative changes that explicitly exclude recipients from social protection or reduce the level thereof on the basis of ethnicity. Indirect welfare chauvinism is the result of policy measures that apply to both natives and immigrants, but which deliberately negatively affect immigrants the most. Combining quantitative and qualitative analysis of labour market reforms in Denmark, where one of the most successful populist right‐wing parties in Europe – the Danish People's Party – held a pivotal position in the period 2001–11, the article traces the intentions and deliberate policy‐making strategies of the party. It shows that the distinction between direct and indirect chauvinism is a useful theoretical tool for understanding how the Danish People's Party can fulfill the expectations of both its electorate and its coalition partners, even if they point in different directions.

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Section: The Policy Effects Of Populist Right‐wing Partiesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party

et al. 2016

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“…Green‐Pedersen and Krogstrup (: 626) argue that coalition dynamics constrain the ability of the Moderates (Sweden's largest centre‐right party) to move in the direction of the anti‐immigrant party. Therefore, the potential absorption of the Sweden Democrats into the right‐wing bloc – similar to what took place earlier in Denmark and Norway – is seen as less likely than the dismantling of the contemporary bloc structure of Swedish politics (Aylott & Bolin : 738). Therefore, right‐leaning party members could be tempted by this cross‐cutting cleavage and we propose the following hypothesis on potential pull factors: H3:Party members with more intolerant migrant attitudes are more likely to cast a defecting vote, particularly if they are members of a party leaning toward the political right. …”

Section: Breaking the Bond: When And Why Party Members Defectmentioning

confidence: 99%

Electoral infidelity: Why party members cast defecting votes

Polk

Kölln

2017

European J Political Res

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Party politics and electoral research generally assume that party members are loyal voters. This article first assesses the empirical basis for this assumption before providing individual-level explanations for defection. We combine prominent theories from party politics and electoral behavior research and argue that internal disagreement and external pressure can each bring about disloyal voting. We motivate our hypotheses with multi-country European survey data and test them on two sets of party-level national surveys. The results show, first, that on average 8 percent of European party members cast a defecting vote in the last election and, second, that dissatisfaction with the leadership is the strongest predictor of defection. Additionally, internal ideological disagreement is associated with higher probabilities of defection, whereas the effects of pull factors in the form of contentious policies are rather limited. These findings emphasize the importance of testing scientific assumptions and the potential significance of party leadership contests.

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“…Survey respondents were asked to volunteer for in depth interviews and the quotas gathered together respondents holding different views towards a ban and who sympathised with one of the three major parties represented in the Swedish parliament (the Social Democrats, the Moderate party and the Sweden Democrats). The Moderate party is positioned on the right-hand side of the political spectrum, while the Social Democratic party is traditionally placed to the left in Swedish politics (Aylott and Bolin 2015;Hagevi 2014). In contrast to the other two, the SD is an outspoken nationalist party (e.g.…”

Section: Methods and Datamentioning

confidence: 99%

Vulnerability and deviance: individual reasoning about the proposal to ban begging in Sweden

Zelano

2018

Urban Research & Practice

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This article situates the phenomenon of visible begging in the context of the welfare state, exploring the relationship between welfare institutions and social marginalisation. Combining survey data with 26 interviews, the article explores what Swedes think about the proposal to ban begging. The results confirm earlier studies emphasising the norms of egalitarianism and insider privilege in universal welfare states. However, the results identify pragmatism, non-materialist egalitarianism, and non-coercion as complementary frames in individual reasoning about begging. Finally, the results indicate a blurred distinction between vulnerability and deviance in reasoning about begging, nuancing previous ideas about social policy preferences.

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Polarising Pluralism: The Swedish Parliamentary Election of September 2014

Cited by 36 publications

References 13 publications

Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party

Direct and Indirect Welfare Chauvinism as Party Strategies: An Analysis of the Danish People's Party

Electoral infidelity: Why party members cast defecting votes

Vulnerability and deviance: individual reasoning about the proposal to ban begging in Sweden

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