Poland in Transition: Implications for a European Security and Defence Policy

A Polónia e a periferia oriental da Europa: continuidade ou rutura na política externa de Varsóvia

“…O seu projeto europeu continua a ser encarado como uma prioridade, sendo disso exemplo o recente debate sobre a adoção da moeda única, a curto-médio prazo. Porém, e apesar do seu envolvimento nas políticas de segurança e defesa europeia, as autoridades polacas têm mostrado uma descrença face à capacidade de afirmação da UE enquanto ator independente (Chappell, 2010).…”

U.S. Missile Defense Site in Europe as an Aliance Security Dilemma

“…70 Doufali přitom, že za svou pomoc získají významný podíl na válečné kořisti (ekonomické zisky z kontraktů na obnovu Iráku), ale to se nestalo. 71 Přesto Varšava -ve shodě s Washingtonem -nepřála společným evropským obranným iniciativám, 72 samozřejmě zejména proto, že potenciálně hrozily oslabit význam a výlučnost Američany vedené Severoatlantické aliance, jejíž další východní rozšíření Polsko prosazovalo. 73 Za doklad přetrvávající silně atlanticistní orientace Varšavy (a zároveň jejích rizik) lze označit například nedávný skandál vyvolaný přítomností tajných věznic CIA na území Polska.…”

Historical experiences, strategic culture, and strategic behavior: Poland in the anti-ISIS coalition

“…First, the appeasement policy of Britain andFrance toward Hitler in 1938-1939 and the failure of these two countries to support the defense of Poland in 1939 "gave rise to a very skeptical view of Western Europe and, specifically, of its ability to guarantee security and stability on the Continent" (Longhurst 2013, p. 363). Second, the West's deal with Stalin that the Soviet Union could annex a part of eastern Poland in 1945, although Poland was compensated with territory taken from Germany, and the agreement between the Americans, British and Soviets at the Yalta conference that Central and Eastern Europe would belong to the Soviet sphere of influence, created a feeling among Poles that they were not in control of their own sovereignty (see also below) (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003, p. 1014, Chappell 2010, p. 229, Longhurst 2013. The feeling of being a victim of disloyalty or betrayal was further reinforced during the Cold War, more specifically by the perceived inability of the United Nations (UN) to prevent the superpower confrontation that left Poland on the wrong side of the divided Europe (Osica 2004, p. 304).…”

“…The main argument is that the Polish case can be explained by using the concept of strategic culture, since it takes into consideration a country's core beliefs in military strategic matters and the historical experiences on which these beliefs are based. Polish strategic culture has been studied in previous research (Zaborowski and Longhurst 2003, Osica 2004, Chappell 2010, Terlikowski 2013, Szpyra and Trochowska 2014, Doeser 2016a). However, this article adds to our understanding of Polish strategic culture by empirically demonstrating the influence of culture on a case of Polish security policy decision-making, which has not been the subject of previous research.…”