POCA: First Power-on Chip Authentication in Untrusted Foundry and Assembly

Sami, Md Sami Ul Islam; Rahman, Fahim; Cron, Adam; Donchin, D.R.; Borza, Mike; Farahmandi, Farimah; Tehranipoor, Mark

doi:10.1109/host49136.2021.9702285

Cited by 11 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 30 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…These assets contain sensitive information proprietary to the chip designer and are vital to security operations, such as secure data transfers, chiplet activation at boot, client-server authentication, etc. [49], [50]. Typically, these assets reside in secure tamper-proof memory (TPM) (e.g., non-volatile memory (NVM)) within the SiP and are passed through (unencrypted) the chiplets during data communication at the interposer layer.…”

Section: A Case C1: Probing-based Information Leakagementioning

confidence: 99%

Advancing Trustworthiness in System-in-Package: A Novel Root-of-Trust Hardware Security Module for Heterogeneous Integration

Sami,

Zhang,

Shuvo

et al. 2024

IEEE Access

Self Cite

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The semiconductor industry has adopted heterogeneous integration (HI), incorporating modular intellectual property (IP) blocks (chiplets) into a unified system-in-package (SiP) to overcome the slowdown in Moore's Law and Dennard scaling and to respond to the increasing demand for advanced integrated circuits (ICs). Despite the manifold benefits of HI, such as enhanced performance, reduced area overhead, and improved yield, this transformation has also led to security vulnerabilities in the SiP supply chain and in-field operations, ranging from chiplet piracy and SiP reverse engineering (RE) to information leakage. Although conventional countermeasures provide the desired robustness for monolithic ICs, they are insufficient for addressing these challenges in the context of HI. To address these concerns, this paper presents a novel root-of-trust architecture, augmenting the process of integration using a centralized chiplet hardware security module (CHSM), aiming to provide comprehensive and robust protection throughout the SiP supply chain and in-field operations. Also, the proposed architecture equipped with the CHSM effectively addresses potential security breaches while providing robust protection against zero-day attacks through its reconfigurable capabilities. Throughout five detailed case studies, this paper performs a comprehensive security analysis to illustrate the resilience of CHSM against contemporary attack scenarios in the HI domain.

show abstract

Section: A Case C1: Probing-based Information Leakagementioning

confidence: 99%