Plutonium gamma-ray measurements for mutual reciprocal inspections of dismantled nuclear weapons

Koenig, Z.M.; Carlson, J.B.; Clark, D.; Gosnell, T.B.

doi:10.2172/102365

Cited by 3 publications

(2 citation statements)

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“…The JOINT STATEMENT ON INSPECTION OF FACILITIES CONTAINING FISSILE MATERIALS REMOVED FROM NUCLEAR WEAPON, which was agreed to by Secretary Hazel O'Leary and Minister Viktor Mikhailov, established the framework for the interaction involving technical experts from the United States and the Russian Federation to consider the measurement of the characteristics of weapons-quality plutonium [11,12]. These cooperative experiments were instigated to understand what measurements could be made jointly between the United States and Russian Federation and how these measurements could be implemented in an agreement between the two parties.…”

Section: Mutual Reciprocal Inspections (Mri)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

Luke¹

2011

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Section: Mutual Reciprocal Inspections (Mri)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

Luke¹

2011

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“…Koenig pursued this idea and developed software intended for use in MRI. 7 He built on a more generalized tool created earlier by Gunnink. 8 The tool was named "Pu600" after the range of spectral lines it utilizes.…”

Section: Detector and Acquisition Systemmentioning

confidence: 99%

<title>Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring</title>

Wolford

MacArthur

1999

SPIE Proceedings

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June 2, 1999This is a preprint of a paper intended for publication in a journal or proceedings. Since changes may be made before publication, this preprint is made available with the understanding that it will not be cited or reproduced without the permission of the author. PREPRINTThis paper was prepared for submittal to the DISCLAIMER This document was prepared as an account of work sponsored by an agency of the United States Government. Neither the United States Government nor the University of California nor any of their employees, makes any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process disclosed, or represents that its use would not infringe privately owned rights. Reference herein to any specific commercial product, process, or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation, or favoring by the United States Government or the University of California. The views and opinions of authors expressed herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of the United States Government or the University of California, and shall not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes. ABSTRACTThe US and the Russian Federation are currently engaged in negotiating or implementing several nuclear arms and nuclear material control agreements. These involve placing nuclear material in specially designed containers within controlled facilities. Some of the agreements require the removal of nuclear components from stockpile weapons. These components are placed in steel containers that are then sealed and tagged. Current strategies for monitoring the agreements involve taking neutron and gamma radiation measurements of components in their containers to monitor the presence, mass, and composition of plutonium or highly enriched uranium, as well as other attributes that indicate the use of the material in a weapon. If accurate enough to be useful, these measurements will yield data containing information about the design of the weapon being monitored. In each case, the design data are considered sensitive by one or both parties to the agreement. To prevent the disclosure of this information in a bilateral or trilateral inspection scenario, so-called information barriers have evolved. These barriers combine hardware, software, and procedural safeguards to contain the sensitive data within a protected volume, presenting to the inspector only the processed results needed for verification. Interlocks and volatile memory guard against disclosure in case of failure. Implementing these safeguards requires innovation in radiation measurement instruments and data security. Demonstrating their reliability requires independent testing to uncover any flaws in design. This study discusses the general problem and gives a proposed solution for a high resolution gamma ray detection system. It uses historical examples to illust...

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Prospects for Limiting Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

Diakov

2022

Her. Russ. Acad. Sci.

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Plutonium gamma-ray measurements for mutual reciprocal inspections of dismantled nuclear weapons

Cited by 3 publications

References 1 publication

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

Exploring the Possible Use of Information Barriers for future Biological Weapons Verification Regimes

<title>Safeguards for nuclear material transparency monitoring</title>

Prospects for Limiting Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons

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