Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience

Reisch, George A.

doi:10.1086/392642

Cited by 41 publications

(10 citation statements)

References 11 publications

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“…Science can be seen as a space whose boundaries are not rigid but are constantly being negotiated as science gradually expands its scope of exploratory capacity (Derksen, 1993;Gieryn, 1995;Lugg, 1995;Reisch, 1998;Thagard, 1993). Consequently, the differentiation between science and pseudo-science is not clear-cut but rather a continuum.…”

Section: Pseudo-scientific Beliefs and Their Incidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Pseudo‐science: A meaningful context for assessing nature of science

Afonso

Gilbert

2009

International Journal of Science Education

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Section: Pseudo-scientific Beliefs and Their Incidencementioning

confidence: 99%

Pseudo‐science: A meaningful context for assessing nature of science

Afonso

Gilbert

2009

International Journal of Science Education

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“…concerned with physical reality), with all claims to knowledge subject to debate, contestation and inflected by politics (e.g. Ibarra & Mormann, 2003;Reisch, 1997Reisch, , 1998. Importantly, the activities of this scholar, underscore that there is no reason why this body of research cannot be used to forward progressive social policies against the market-based modernisation agendas that are reworked by neoliberalism.…”

Section: An Example Of a Sequential Multiple Paradigm Reviewmentioning

confidence: 93%

The discourses of marketing and development: towards ‘critical transformative marketing research’

Tadajewski

Chelekis

DeBerry‐Spence

et al. 2014

Journal of Marketing Management

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In order to understand the connection between development, marketing and transformative consumer research (TCR), with its attendant interest in promoting human well-being, this article begins by charting the links between US 'exceptionalism', 'Manifest Destiny' and modernisation theory, demonstrating the confluence of US perspectives and experiences in articulations and understandings of the contributions of marketing practice and consumer research to society. Our narrative subsequently engages with the rise of social marketing (1960s-) and finally TCR (2006-). We move beyond calls for an appreciation of paradigm plurality to encourage TCR scholars to adopt a multiple paradigmatic approach as part of a three-pronged strategy that encompasses an initial 'provisional moral agnosticism'. As part of this stance, we argue that scholars should value the insights provided by multiple paradigms, turning each paradigmatic lens sequentially on to the issue of the relationship between marketing, development and consumer well-being. After having scrutinised these issues using multiple perspectives, scholars can then decide whether to pursue TCR-led activism. The final strategy that we identify is termed 'critical intolerance'.

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“…PSES may be pathological and misguided, but it is still an epistemic stance. Perhaps, pseudo-scientists are simply willing to take on more epistemic risk that reputable scientists and philosophers of science (Psillos, 2021 and Slater, 2021 make a similar point; see also Reisch, 1998). The same applies mutatis mutandis to other pseudo-sciences.…”

Section: What Is Pses?mentioning

confidence: 98%

Stance Pluralism, Scientology, and the Problem of Relativism

Merwe

2022

Found Sci

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Inspired by Bas van Fraassen's Stance Empiricism, Anjan Chakravartty has developed a pluralistic account of what he calls epistemic stances towards scientific ontology. In this paper, I examine whether Chakravartty's stance pluralism can exclude epistemic stances that licence pseudo-scientific practices like those found in Scientology. I argue that it cannot. Chakravartty's stance pluralism is therefore prone to a form of debilitating relativism. I consequently argue that we need (1) some ground or constraint in relation to which epistemic stances can be ranked by degrees, and (2) some way to demarcate science from pseudoscience so that we know what epistemic stances are about. Regarding (1), I argue that empirical detectability can serve as the ground in relation to which epistemic stances are ranked by degrees. Regarding (2), I argue for ranking sciences on a continuum according to established institutional criteria, rather than attempting to draw a strict demarcation.

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Pluralism, Logical Empiricism, and the Problem of Pseudoscience

Cited by 41 publications

References 11 publications

Pseudo‐science: A meaningful context for assessing nature of science

Pseudo‐science: A meaningful context for assessing nature of science

The discourses of marketing and development: towards ‘critical transformative marketing research’

Stance Pluralism, Scientology, and the Problem of Relativism

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