Plural self-awareness

Schmid, Hans Bernhard

doi:10.1007/s11097-013-9317-z

Cited by 96 publications

(56 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…Concerning any alleged self-consciousness of HOPs 'themselves,' the passages under consideration evoke nothing other than a kind of ethical or normative 'stocktaking,' 'self-assessment' or 'self-determination' of its own rational point of view (Selbstwertung, Selbstgestaltung; Hua XXVII, 49). It is not, in any particularly compelling sense, some "pre-reflective plural self-awareness" (Schmid 2014;cf. Szanto 2014a).…”

Section: Two Objections: Content/vehicle-fallacy and Collective Conscmentioning

confidence: 99%

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Szanto

2016

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

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Section: Two Objections: Content/vehicle-fallacy and Collective Conscmentioning

confidence: 99%

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Szanto

2016

Studies in the Philosophy of Sociality

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“…Schmid himself claims to argue for a mixed view of mode and subject account, by which he assumes that collective intentions have the structure "we we-intend to X." 15 Most important, Schmid attempts to argue for the possibility of plural subjects without falling into either trap of infinite regress and circularity. Moreover, the aim is to come up with a "more relaxed" mode view according to which it is not necessary that each agent has to (actively) commit herself to be a partner of cooperation prior to entering into a collective intention.…”

Section: The Central Idea and Types Of Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Rather, it is supposed to be sufficient to assume collectivity as a background condition for cooperative behavior, that is, agents must only conceive of each other as potentially cooperative partners. 16 According to Schmid, we can only achieve these objectives if we assume a tacit or underlying "sense of us" that ultimately explains how explicit attitudes may be collective. What he attempts to show is that this tacit awareness of "us" functions as a necessary background condition of collective attitudes.…”

Section: The Central Idea and Types Of Explanationmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…It is assumed to be both an enabling (background) and a constitutive condition of the "we" in collective attitudes. 21 Most important, the approach obviously attempts to overcome problems of other accounts, especially, the problems of circularity and of infinite regress as presented in the previous section. So it needs to be shown that collective attitudes are not grounded in the structure of the singular perspective.…”

Section: Pre-reflective Plural Self-awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…In these cases, it would, according to Schmid, be inadequate to say that one person first acknowledges and evaluates a specific intention of another person, before, in a second step, endorsing the same intention himself somewhat privately. 22 Rather, there seems to be a basic way in which collective attitudes are transparent as ours; members of a group are aware of the "sharedness" of their collective attitude. Moreover, plural self-awareness is supposed to give rise to a shared perspective.…”

Section: Pre-reflective Plural Self-awarenessmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Collective Attitudes and the Sense of Us: Feeling of Commitment and Limits of Plural Self‐Awareness

Crone¹

2018

Journal of Social Philosophy

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This article explores the particular structure of a collective perspective-the perspective of two or more persons referring to an object, which is sometimes called a "we-perspective." The phenomenon in question seems to be present in various forms of social activities: for instance, in joint action such as when two persons are going to the cinema together to watch a film; or in collective attitudes, when two persons are both intending to go to the cinema together. While the question of what structure underlies an individual perspective of one person has for a long time dominated many discussions in the philosophy of mind (especially debates on self-consciousness and of intentionality) the collective perspective of several persons has become a target of philosophical interest especially in the past few years.Current debates are mainly concerned with the question of what feature may be responsible for the "collectivity" in collective perspectives. 1 In search of an explanation a number of approaches have concentrated on features of the content, the mode, or the subject of collective attitudes. These approaches all have yet in common that they focus on the structure of (more or less) explicitly expressed attitudes of groups. Hans Bernhard Schmid has recently introduced an argument into the discussion that turns to implicit and pre-reflective underpinnings of a collective perspective. According to his claim, central features of a collective perspective are to be explained by an underlying pre-reflective awareness of plural subjectivity. 2 He argues that an explicit representation of "we" that is manifest in collective attitudes and cooperative behavior presupposes a "pre-reflective plural self-awareness," an implicit "sense of us." Schmid construes his argument in analogy to approaches to individual self-consciousness, according to which the capacity of explicit self-representation requires a prereflective or primitive self-awareness. 3 Overall, I am sympathetic to the general idea of analyzing the structure of a given phenomenon in terms of a relevant implicit mode of awareness. However, I think that Schmid's account is problematic in various respects. I will mainly argue that his description of the phenomenon raises difficulties and has some implausible consequences in view of the target features of groups and collective attitudes. (i) In the first part of the article I will sketch the general motivation for explaining the collective perspective of two or more persons. (ii) After presenting Schmid's argument for plural self-awareness, (iii) I will construe two

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Self-Feeling and Unity

Kreuch

2019

Self-Feeling

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Plural self-awareness

Cited by 96 publications

References 15 publications

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Husserl on Collective Intentionality

Collective Attitudes and the Sense of Us: Feeling of Commitment and Limits of Plural Self‐Awareness

Self-Feeling and Unity

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