Plotinus on Sense-Perception

Emilsson, Eyjólfur Kjalar

doi:10.1017/cbo9780511720017

Cited by 118 publications

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“…187-228;Caston [Content]; Garcia-Ramirez 2010; Marmodoro 2014. 39 Even though Emilsson 1988 is not explicit on this, but his description of Aristotle`s view on phantasia seems to be closer to Alexander`s, and he shows Plotinus` reliance on that (p 107-112). Cf.…”

Section: Annas Notes Without Further Elaboration Thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

Hangai¹

2018

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I discuss the account of phantasia of Alexander of Aphrodisias, a most prominent Late-Antique Aristotelian. For Aristotle phantasia is a motion of the perceptive soul that makes possible a great amount of activities and higher cognitions beyond sense-perception. Phantasia became a fundamental psychological concept in the Hellenistic Era: in empiricist epistemology, in action theory as perceptual representation of the external world; in aesthetics as creative imagination.I argue that Alexander proceeds from an Aristotelian framework of parts and capacities of the soul, but unlike Aristotle, he distinguishes a distinct capacity for phantasia. The main reason for this comes from his polemic against the Stoics: they do not acknowledge an activity of phantasia. A distinct activity requires a distinct object, which in turn a distinct capacity. The distinct status of a phantasia-capacity in itself modifies the architecture of the soul in comparison with Aristotle. But in addition Alexander makes important changes in the framework: he makes capacities as basic (and rather modular), and parts and the soul as sets of capacities.The object of phantasia is the residue from perception in activity. The status of this as internal object needs clarification. I show that it is internal on account of being a physical process in the body. Again, I argue that it is the causal object of phantasia: it is the item that provides content to the phantasia-activity by triggering it. But the residue is not an intentional object: it is a representation of something else. I give a reconstruction of Alexander`s account how the residue may be representation. Accordingly, it is a representation in virtue of preserving fully a perceptual content (something that had been perceived); or in virtue of functioning as an equivalent of a fully preserved residue insofar as phantasia completed an incompletely preserved residue. The latter case explains a wide range of cases, in general the fact that phantasia is more prone to error than perception.Finally I analyse the activity of phantasia. I argue that its content is propositional, in particular it is 'S is P'μ a predication of a perceptible feature P of a thing that caused a perception S. First, I show that it is implausible to construe simple cases of phantasia (or perception: for perception has the same type of content as phantasia) as non-propositional, demonstrating that the ὁἴjἷἵt ὄἷaἶiὀg ὁf thἷ ἵὁὀtἷὀt (x ὅἷἷὅ 'whitἷ') iὅ iὀaἶἷὃuatἷ iὀ that at thἷ ἴἷὅt it ὄἷἶuἵἷὅ tὁ ἷxiὅtἷὀtial ὂὄὁὂὁὅitiὁὀὅ ('thἷὄἷ iὅ whitἷ')έ χgaiὀ, I analyse two positive evidences. (1) Alexander`s account of the truth-conditions of phantasia implies propositional content: CEU eTD Collection iv phantasia is about an existent thing, S; and it is such as the thing, P. (2) The account of simultaneous perception (of several perceptibles) entails propositional content, and even uses ἷxamὂlἷὅ aὅ 'thiὅ iὅ whitἷ'έThe phantasia-activity is said to be krisis, which I take to be judgement: primarily because its content is propositional. I ...

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Section: Annas Notes Without Further Elaboration Thatmentioning

confidence: 99%

Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

Hangai¹

2018

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“…19 Cfr. Bréhier (1928, p. 68), Trouillard (1955, Emilsson (1988, p. 29) y Remes (2007. Para un estudio detallado del estado de la cuestión, cfr.…”

Section: Estado De La Cuestiónunclassified

Individualidad y conciencia en Plotino

Félix

2022

Tópicos (México)

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La cuestión de la individualidad en Plotino es una de las más debatidas. A lo largo de las Enéadas, la problemática del sujeto individual se ve atravesada por la complejidad en la comprensión del hombre y del alma. Al hombre inteligible, al hombre interior o primer hombre, viene a añadírsele un segundo hombre, de modo que “hemos llegado a ser el conjunto de ambos hombres” (En. VI 4 (22) 14.28-30). Esta cuestión ha sido extensamente tratada desde diferentes ángulos que desembocan bien en una solución puramente estructuralista, o bien, en su crítica y la búsqueda de una definición más estable de la identidad subjetiva. La tesis que defenderemos en este artículo, y que nos posicionará en el debate, trata de dar una nueva perspectiva de la cuestión arraigándola principalmente en el ámbito de la vida y sus formas. La continuidad entre los diferentes hombres vendrá determinada por la continuidad entre los diversos modos de la vida, cuestión primaria a la que se subordina la problemática de la individualidad y los diferentes modos de la conciencia.

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“…24 ¿cómo el alma, que anima el cuerpo, puede al mismo tiempo percibir las afecciones y no verse afectado por ellas? 25 Plotino responde desde un mismo enfoque: que el alma esté "presente" en el compuesto, por medio de la potencia que procede de ella, no entraña en modo alguno que sea responsable o se vea afectada por lo que lleva a cabo el compuesto. 26 El alma inferior, que corresponde al alma sensitivo-vegetativa, es la imagen del alma superior intelectiva.…”

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Plotino y las emociones del Pórtico

Calvo

2023

Synthesis

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En este artículo exploramos la integración de la teoría plotiniana de las emociones a partir de la rehabilitación del órgano sensorial. Desde esta perspectiva, el alma es perturbada por la abundancia de sensaciones y las emociones son consideradas actividades del alma, que se experimentan cuando esta se da cuenta de los estados del cuerpo. Pero, al igual que en el caso de la sensación, el alma no se ve afectada por las emociones del cuerpo. Para vivir de manera virtuosa el alma conoce de qué manera ha de domeñar los afectos irracionales provenientes del cuerpo, ejerciendo el nivel intelectivo del alma un control total de las emociones.

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Plotinus on Sense-Perception

Cited by 118 publications

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Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

Alexander of Aphrodisias on phantasia

Individualidad y conciencia en Plotino

Plotino y las emociones del Pórtico

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