Playing with Trolleys: Intuitions About the Permissibility of Aggregation

Abstract

We explore when experimental subjects think aggregation across persons-deciding that some parties should be worse off, so that others might gain more, compared to an alternative option-is permissible through subjects' responses to trolley problem vignettes. Two classic vignettes are: (1) whether to divert a runaway trolley on to a spur track, killing one, to save multiple potential victims on a main track, and (2) whether to push an overweight person off a bridge to block the trolley from hitting the potential victims. Subjects typically judge diverting in the first problem permissible and pushing in the second problem impermissible. We first show that respondents reject Taurek's claim that the number of victims is irrelevant. Our central novel finding is that the intuition to distinguish the two cases is weaker than the extensive literature emphasizing its significance has implied. Responses to the two problems often converge to a significant extent on the position that aggregation is impermissible because the intuition to divert is both more weakly held and more subject to revision than the intuition against pushing. We show this convergence when the problems are presented together. Moreover, while the strictures against pushing are typically seen as mandatory (and hold even when following the strictures disadvantages kin or more identified parties), the obligation to divert is rarely unqualifiedly mandatory, and even its permissibility is sensitive to potential harm to kin and identifiable people.

Overdiagnosis, ethics, and trolley problems: why factors other than outcomes matter—an essay by Stacy Carter

“…16 Non-consequentialists say that this shows that utilitarians are wrong: something more than outcomes must matter. [14][15][16][17][18][19] Reactions are generally even stronger to a medical example known as "transplant." A skilled transplant surgeon has five patients who will die without immediate transplantation, each of a different organ.…”

“…17 21 People may be less willing to trade lives for lives and more willing to trade injuries or property loss for lives. 17 Avoiding harm may seem more important than providing benefit. 14-22 Serious outcomes may not be exchangeable for (even many) more trivial outcomes.…”

“…13 Rights may be seen as trumping utility. [14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22] Harms may seem morally worse if intended. 16 Trade-offs between already affected groups may be more acceptable than putting new people at risk.…”

“…[13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23] And proximal and identifiable victims may be considered more salient, especially if they are kin. [13][14][15][16][17][18][19][20][21][22][23] These intuitions can't necessarily be morally justified, and ethicists argue about their moral significance. They do, however, indicate likely reactions when people are asked to trade off outcomes among people or to agree to harm a few people to benefit or save more.…”

The means/side-effect distinction in moral cognition: A meta-analysis

“…Nichols & Mallon 2006;DeScioli et al 2012;Gold et al 2013;Millar et al 2014;Kelman & Kreps 2014;May ms-b). Moreover, some studies have found the means/byproduct effect in children (e.g.…”